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This is Part II of a three-part series known as “The Dark Side of Due Process”
published with The St. Mary’s Law Journal. Parts I and III will precede and follow this
article in consecutive issues of this volume at The St. Mary’s Law Journal. An Abstract
and Foreword for this project are printed at the beginning of Part I, and a general
conclusion is printed at the end of Part III.
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF GOOD THINGS
ENGRAINED IN EVIL SYSTEMS
Justice Holmes showed us that by trying to use the bad man’s idea of the
law, even in an attempt to force bad men to be good men, a judge is prone
to become a bad man in the process.1 However, as Kafka assured us,2 a
judge’s consideration of the evils of bad men is not only appropriate but
required.3 Taking a cue from Flannery O’Connor’s focus on Kafka, Part II
examines the dark side of due process as applied in recent cases.4
Flannery O’Connor, who was arguably Kafka’s most brilliant student,
explained the uses of extending Kafka’s style of thinking about evil,
specifically in the American context.5 O’Connor’s writings existed “in
territory held largely by the devil” to show the devil to us, lest he “convince

1. Marco Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069, 2079 (2011);
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927).
2. FLANNERY O’CONNOR, A PRAYER JOURNAL 16 (2013) [hereinafter O’CONNOR,
A PRAYER] (“Please give me the necessary grace, oh Lord, and please don’t let it be as hard to get as
Kafka made it.”); see Robert Fulford, ‘We ought to read only the kind of books that wound us’: How literature
teaches
us
to
be
human,
NATIONAL
POST
(Sept. 19,
2016),
https://nationalpost.com/entertainment/books/we-ought-to-read-only-the-kind-of-books-thatwound-us-how-literature-teaches-us-to-be-human [https://perma.cc/KQM5-2M7W] (quoting from
Kafka: “‘A book must be the axe for the frozen sea within us. That is my belief.’”); infra notes 5–7 and
accompanying text.
3. O’CONNOR, A PRAYER, supra note 2, at 26; Maxwell S. Kennerly, Lessons from Kafka: Aaron
Swartz and Prosecutorial Overreaching (Updated), LITIG. & TRIAL (Jan. 14, 2013),
https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2013/01/articles/series/special-comment/kafka-aaron-swartz/
[https://perma.cc/6T2A-H4RC] (noting how Kafka examined the unsatisfying nature of a world
where the law is not rationally concerned with correcting bad men, but is “frustratingly
incomprehensible”); cf. Edith H. Krause, Wisdom and the Tightrope of Being. Aspects of Nietzsche in Kafka’s
The Metamorphosis (1915), 15 DIALOGUE AND UNIVERSALISM 21, 24, 29 (2005) (noting that Kafka’s
Metamorphosis is a study of the meaninglessness and arbitrariness of Neitzsche’s übermensch ideology).
4. O’CONNOR, A PRAYER, supra note 2, at 13, 16, 26.
5. Id.; see FLANNERY O’CONNOR, MYSTERY AND MANNERS: OCCASIONAL PROSE 97–98
(Sally Fitzgerald & Robert Fitzgerald eds., 1969) [hereinafter O’CONNOR, MYSTERY] (explaining Franz
Kafka’s The Metamorphosis: “The fact is that this story describes the dual nature of man in such a realistic
fashion that it is almost unbearable.”).
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us that he does not exist.”6 Thus, at the very outset of her writing career,
O’Connor made this entry in her prayer journal,
Hell, a literal hell, is our only hope. Take it away & we will become wholly a
wasteland not a half a one. Sin is a great thing as long as it’s recognized. It
leads a good many people to God who wouldn’t get there otherwise. But
cease to recognize it, or take away from devil as devil & give it to devil as
psychologist, and you also take away God. If there is no sin in this world
there is no God in heaven. No heaven. There are those who would have it
that way.7

O’Connor used her stories to show us how even the devil can be used by
God to redeem the world—unwilling as the devil may be in such a project.8
Her stories, therefore, used the devil to “accomplish[] a good deal of the
groundwork that seems to be necessary before grace is effective.”9 For
O’Connor, it was “frequently . . . an action in which the devil has been the
unwilling instrument of grace” that may one day turn her highly problematic,
racist, sexist, murderous, and extremely evil characters “into the prophet[s
they were] meant to become.”10
After January 6, 2021, when a violent mob nearly destroyed democracy
in the United States, O’Connor’s belief in the sort of radical grace that
extends especially to the worst of us who may, for all we know, be motivated
by Satan himself, is encouraging.11 O’Connor furthermore considered the
duality of human vices in her prayer journal, but focused on despair rather
than Hobbesian pride:
I will always be staggering between Despair & Presumption, facing first one
& then the other, deciding which makes me look the best, which fits most
comfortably, most conveniently. I’ll never take a large chunk of anything. I’ll
nibble nervously here & there. Fear of God is right; but God, it is not this

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

O’CONNOR, MYSTERY, supra note 5, at 112, 118.
O’CONNOR, A PRAYER, supra note 2, at 26.
O’CONNOR, MYSTERY, supra note 5, at 113, 118.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 113, 118.
Id. at 118; cf. JESSICA HOOTEN WILSON, GIVING THE DEVIL HIS DUE: DEMONIC
AUTHORITY IN THE FICTION OF FLANNERY O’CONNOR AND FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY 19, 45–46
(2017) (giving a perspective on the uses O’Connor had for the devil and evil men).
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nervousness[.] . . . Sin is large & stale. You can never finish eating it nor ever
digest it. It has to be vomited.12

O’Connor, who routinely spent her evenings reading Thomas Aquinas’
Summa Theologica, did not need Hobbes to explain to her how vices
worked.13 However, Hobbes may be interpreted as one of O’Connor’s
unwilling prophets14 because he intended to follow Satan to the lowest
circles of hell and then somehow assisted humanity despite himself.15 For
Hobbes explained vices to Protestants, agnostics, and atheists so that they
might hear what Catholics already knew, so that Phillis Wheatley could one
day gently correct the generally non-Catholic, English speaking world in
order to cause the American Revolution.16
With Hobbes, we can freely depart from teachings of the Church that
have grown stale.17 For example, Hobbes departed from the idea that vice
is sin, which the Protestant Church characterized as actions or deeds rather
12. O’CONNOR, A PRAYER, supra note 2, at 22.
13. FLANNERY O’CONNOR, THE HABIT OF BEING: LETTERS OF FLANNERY O’CONNOR 93–
94 (Sally Fitzgerald ed., 1988), cited by ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA OF THE SUMMA 11 (Peter Kreeft
ed., 1990); cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 46–48 (A. R. Waller ed., 1904) (describing how the
human vices of pride and dejection worked to drive humanity so insane that they would disregard their
preexisting rights and lift absolute kings into power).
14. O’CONNOR, MYSTERY, supra note 5, at 113, 118.
15. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 46–48 (seeking to refute Aristotle’s virtue theory, Hobbes
ironically provided a better statement of the virtues); see, e.g., Devin Stauffer, “Of Religion” in Hobbes’s
Leviathan, 72 J. POL. 868, 878 (2010) (explaining how Hobbes redefined virtues: “His new principles
may be less exalted than the traditional ones he sought to replace, but he argues that they are clearer
and more rational.”); cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 548, 551 (1945)
[hereinafter RUSSELL, A HISTORY] (noting that “[t]he pacts and covenants by which ‘Leviathan’ is first
created take the place of God’s fiat when He said ‘Let Us make man’ . . . [t]his ‘Leviathan’ is a mortal
God[,]” i.e., the human beings that make up a nation-state as a whole are considered as God and the
nation or state is a Leviathan, an artificial God that resembles the actual God; thus, Leviathan
commands the worship of individuals to the central idea of God-as-the-people, by accepting their
worship as a stand-in for the whole people—this entire analogy is pointedly anti-Christian or at least
outside of Christianity and it was criticized in Hobbes’s day as such, but it resembles modern ideas of
the people and the state so well that Hobbes is far less criticized today, even by those that profess
Christianity).
16. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 46–48; see Joshua J. Schroeder, We Will All Be Free or None Will
Be: Why Federal Power is Not Plenary, but Limited and Supreme, 27 TEX. HISP. J. L. POL’Y 1, 63 (2021)
[hereinafter Schroeder, We Will] (referencing Phillis Wheatley’s action that sparked the American
Revolution).
17. See Stauffer, supra note 15, at 873 (“Again, it was by way of contrast with the gods produced
by the anxiety-gripped imaginations of ignorant men that Hobbes turned, as a digression, to discuss
God as the incomprehensible first cause.”); cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 15, at 549 (explaining
how Hobbes was far more modern than his Puritan contemporaries, for example, he thought the
“[b]elief that dreams are prophetic is a delusion; so is the belief in witchcraft and in ghosts”).
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than, as Hobbes suggested, an oxymoronic emotional state.18 This freed
Hobbes to correct the Protestants in some places, including in their
definition of sin, where perhaps the Protestants needed correction, and
possibly presenting a more accurate version of humanity.19
To achieve his evil ends, Hobbes needed to outdo the church’s version
of virtues and vices enough to make vices seem preferable.20 In so doing,
Hobbes may have become the very instrument of grace from the sins of the
Church that he did not intend to be.21 Therefore, evil and evil systems are
worth considering not only to avoid them, but also to steal from them when
they unwittingly unleashed the very blessings that they meant to hold
back.22
From the Arendtian perspective, we can see that evil is essentially banal
and Hobbes’s tracts were not banal; rather, the tracts were rich and
marvelous, notwithstanding his ends being undoubtedly evil.23 Therefore,
there must be some good in his writing to steal from Hobbes before cutting
him off from his desired end.24 Similarly, Kierkegaard stole from Hegel

18. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 46–48; cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 15, at 550 (noting that
in Hobbes’s “state of nature, there is no property, no justice or injustice; there is only war, and ‘force
and fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues’”).
19. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 46–48.
20. Id.; cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 15, at 550 (offering a perspective on Hobbes’s
redefinition of vices as virtues).
21. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 46–48; see Jennifer Billingsley, Works of Wonder, Wondering Eyes,
and the Wondrous Poet: The Use of Wonder in Phillis Wheatley’s Marvelous Poetics, in NEW ESSAYS ON PHILLIS
WHEATLEY 174 (John C. Shields & Eric D. Lamore eds., 2011) (describing how Wheatley both
accepted the gifts of Hobbesian philosophy, while refuting its biggest errors).
22. Billingsley, supra note 21, at 174; see Karla V. Zelaya, Sweat the Technique: Visible-izing Praxis
Through Mimicry in Phillis Wheatley’s “On Being Brought from Africa to America” 3 (Sept. 2015) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst) (available on Scholar works of University of
Massachusetts, Amherst) (“Wheatley in fact established a poetic prototype for ‘a poaching raid of sorts,
a stealing of signs’ that had already existed in colonial culture.”); RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 15,
at 555 (“Let us now try to decide what we are to think of the Leviathan. The question is not easy,
because the good and the bad in it are so closely intermingled.”).
23. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 54
(1963); see Billingsley, supra note 21, at 174 (describing Hobbesian wonder).
24. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 3–13 (Hobbes’s descriptions of the imagination and the
consequence or train of imaginations are almost certainly included in the material Hobbes established
that benefited humankind and is worth preserving); see Billingsley, supra note 21, at 174 (explaining how
Wheatley “invokes the miraculous wonder Hobbes described”); see also Zelaya, supra note 22, at 3
(arguing Wheatley exemplified the “strategic re-citation of Anglo European literary markers”).
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and invented Existentialism, a very useful frame of thought that inspired
thinkers like Heidegger and Sartre.25
Flannery O’Connor stole directly from Satan himself (or at least, she
thought of herself as doing so).26 James Baldwin stole from Nietzsche to
make a place for himself in France and America; in the same way, Phillis
Wheatley told Mæcenas, “I’ll snatch a laurel from thine honour’d head.”27
So too, American lawyers may steal from Justice Holmes to preserve the
blessings he did not mean to impart, including his firm assertion of common
law de novo review of state criminal cases that he required in Moore v.
Dempsey.28
The Dark Side of Due Process: Part II will focus on the practical, recent
effects of the dark side of due process in court. It will begin with a response
to recent shadow docket activity that led to the nullification of Roe v. Wade29
in the 2021 case Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson.30 Then it will discuss Kelli
Dillon’s witness against California’s resurrection of eugenics in the 2000s.31
Finally, it will name several recently established Star Chambers in America
linked to the Mathews v. Eldridge32 cost/benefit balancing framework.33

25. JON STEWART, KIERKEGAARD’S RELATIONS TO HEGEL RECONSIDERED 185–87 (2003).
See generally SØREN KIERKEGAARD, EITHER/OR (1843) (reshaping Hegelian ideology into a useful
philosophy known as Existentialism).
26. O’CONNOR, MYSTERY, supra note 5, at 113, 118.
27. Phillis Wheatley, To Mæcenas [1773]; JAMES BALDWIN, THE CROSS OF REDEMPTION:
UNCOLLECTED WRITINGS 78 (Randall Kenan ed., 2010) (paraphrasing FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,
THUS SPAKE ZARATHURSTRA 169 (Thomas Common trans., 1896)).
28. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was perhaps the most vigilant preserver of the unintended
gifts of Holmesian ideology in the past era. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299–303 (1992)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (addressing and adding to a list started by Justice Thomas, giving several
decisions that applied de novo review in habeas cases, beginning with “Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923) . . . , and Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 . . . (1915)”); Sandra Day O’Connor, They Often Are Half
Obscure: The Rights of the Individual and the Legacy of Oliver W. Holmes, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 385, 394–95
(1992) [hereinafter O’Connor, They Often] (describing the significance of Moore and Frank).
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021) (calling Ex parte Young into
question); id. at 2498 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court chose not to “enjoin a flagrantly
unconstitutional law”).
31. See generally BELLY OF THE BEAST (Erika Cohn dir., 2020).
32. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
33. See Joshua J. Schroeder, Conservative Progressivism in Immigrant Habeas Court: Why Boumediene v.
Bush is the Baseline Constitutional Minimum, 45 THE HARBINGER 46, 51–52 n.13 (2021) [hereinafter
Schroeder, Conservative] (explaining how cost/benefit balancing tests are used by conservative judges to
“bypass liberal criticism”); id. at 56. Compare Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 340 (2014), and Dep’t
of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (quoting Landon v. Placensia,
459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (applying a Mathews balancing test)), with Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Habeas:

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss3/1

6

Schroeder: The Dark Side of Due Process: Part II
SCHROEDER II_STEP 5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART II

2/20/2022 9:53 AM

655

A. REGARDING THE SHADOW DOCKET AND THE NULLIFICATION OF
ROE V. WADE
The United States Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” first exploded into
view in 2014 when the Court issued an equitable order on behalf of Wheaton
College to clog legally mandated contraceptive coverage.34 The issuance of
an equitable order prior to administering any legal process to justify it is
completely imprudent and counter to the Court’s general, prior practice.35
The shockwaves that Wheaton College v. Burwell36 caused were the conceptual
birth of the shadow docket.37
This is to say that Professor William Baude coined the term “shadow
docket” to characterize the Wheaton College injunction.38 But even the term
“shadow docket” was created out of Baude’s boredom with “the Term’s
merits cases,” which he thought “were a fizzle rather than a bang.”39 Baude
Due Process, the Suspension Clause, and Judicial Review of Expedited Removal Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 405, 446 (2020).
34. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 959 (2014); see Joshua J. Schroeder, America’s Written
Constitution: Remembering the Judicial Duty to Say What the Law Is, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 833,
877–84 (2015) [hereinafter Schroeder, America’s] (“The Court ventured into a minefield when it
contradicted the authority of its own stare decisis, using an equitable injunction before a case or
controversy was heard by the Court.”); see also William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow
Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 7–8 (2015) (describing the peculiar nature of Wheaton College in the
dissent by the Justices).
35. Wheaton Coll., 573 U.S. at 959 (contradicting Hobby Lobby and directly violating the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) by allowing Wheaton College to affirmatively block women from obtaining
contraceptive insurance coverage that the federal law mandated); id. at 960–61 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “[i]njunctions of this nature are proper only where ‘the legal rights at issue are
indisputably clear’” and emphasizing that the legal rights involved in Wheaton College were anything but
clear) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 507 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., in
chambers)); Schroeder, America’s, supra note 34, at 877–84; cf. Baude, supra note 34, at 23.
36. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958 (2014).
37. See supra notes 34–35; Dahlia Lithwick & Sonja West, Quick Change Justice: While You Were
Sleeping, Hobby Lobby Just Got So Much Worse, SLATE (July 4, 2014, 2:59 PM), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2014/07/wheaton-college-injunction-the-supreme-court-just-sneakily-reversed-itself-onhobby-lobby.html [https://perma.cc/3R6G-LHMM] (explaining the shocking shadow docket
behavior in Wheaton College without the term “shadow docket” because it had not yet been coined by
Professor William Baude); Baude, supra note 34, at 7–8 (coining the term “shadow docket” in reference
to the Wheaton College injunction).
38. Baude, supra note 34, at 5–8; cf. Charlie Savage, Texas Abortion Case Highlights Concern Over
Supreme
Court’s
‘Shadow
Docket’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept. 2,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/02/us/politics/supreme-court-shadow-docket-texasabortion.html [https://perma.cc/6YVT-ESER] (noting that the Court’s “orders docket . . . was
deemed the ‘shadow docket’ in 2015, in an influential law journal article by William Baude, a University
of Chicago law professor”).
39. Baude, supra note 34, at 3.
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began speaking of a shadow docket with an air of apparent indifference,
while I reported on the fireworks caused by the Court feigning positivism,
which pinnacled in Hobby Lobby and was completely “obliterated by the
Wheaton injunction” only three days later.40
Wheaton College’s extreme assertion of equitable power right after Hobby
Lobby promised never to do such a thing broke Justice Sotomayor’s trust in
the Court to do what it says it will do.41 A similar turning point occurred
in Justice Stevens’ career when he wrote in Pennhurtst State School v.
Halderman:42 “This case has illuminated the character of an institution.”43
Baude failed to recognize that as a result of Wheaton College, Sotomayor’s
trust in the integrity of the Court was broken to the point that she would no
longer presume to take the Court at its word.44
Instead, Baude picked at Sotomayor for not seeing the Court’s character
sooner—a cruel thing to say about someone right after they realized how
they had been duped.45 According to Baude’s own seemingly smug analysis,
the shadow docket remained uninteresting to most lawyers until Roe v. Wade
was nullified by the shadow docket in 2021 and it is now being investigated
by Congress.46 Even as it may have dawned on Professor Baude after Whole
40. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell (Wheaton Temporary Injunction), 573 U.S. 943 (2014) (granting
Wheaton College a temporary injunction on June 30, 2014, which presumably ended on June 3, 2014
when the injunction was made effectively permanent as long as Wheaton kept litigating); Wheaton Coll.,
573 U.S. at 958–59 (inventing an informal way for Wheaton College to initiate their own injunction
against the government “[i]f the applicant informs the Secretary of Health and Human Services in
writing” on July 3, 2014); Wheaton Coll. v. Azar, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219163, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill.
2018) (granting a permanent injunction and noting how this result occurred by other shadow docket
behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court after the Wheaton College injunction that seemed to indicate that
once you get an adverse shadow docket ruling that it is effectively permanent and will be enforced
eventually by actually calling it a permanent injunction years later); Schroeder, America’s, supra note 34,
at 834–36, 874. I originally wrote “four days” after Hobby Lobby because much of the news coverage
was received by the public on the Fourth of July of 2014 and presumably that was when Wheaton
College initiated the conditions for the injunction stipulated by the court and the question of when
things happened in this scrunched timeline is a matter to technicality. Id. at 859, 874 (noting the
extremely confusing events that occurred as the 2013 term ended).
41. Schroeder, America’s, supra note 34, at 865.
42 Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
43. Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 126 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Baude, supra note 34, at 7–8.
45. Id. (“Justice Sotomayor herself granted Little Sisters a temporary stay on New Year’s Eve,
(just before she led the countdown for the ball-drop in Times Square).”).
46. Id.; Savage, supra note 38 (noting that the nullification of Roe v. Wade caused many to have
concern over the United States Supreme Court’s shadow docket); Samantha O’Connell, Supreme Court
“Shadow Docket” Under Review by U.S. House of Representatives, ABA (Apr. 14, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/publications/proj
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Woman’s Health was decided that he might have made a molehill out of a
mountain, Professor Charles Fried spoke up for the old guard, “‘I think the
fuss about the shadow docket lacks perspective.’”47
In response to Wheaton College’s betrayal of principle, Justice Sotomayor
issued a ringing dissent joined by the women of the Court.48 This dissent
reverberated in news coverage over the next several weeks, initiating
discussions in which law professors, starting with Professor Baude, began
referring to the Court’s equity docket as the shadow docket.49 By naming
an order a part of the shadow docket, lawyers, including Professor Baude,
simply mean to take heed of Justice Sotomayor’s warning in Wheaton
College—that we can no longer take for granted that the Court’s equity will
follow law or precedent.50
In the shadow docket, the Court issues orders prior to or in lieu of a
decision on the merits, and oftentimes, directly contradicting written law.51
For example, Wheaton College was granted an equitable order that allowed
ect_blog/scotus-shadow-docket-under-review-by-house-reps/ (noting that death penalty cases
affected by the shadow docket also piqued the interest of lawyers regarding the shadow docket in 2021).
47. Lana Barnett, Pay No Attention to the Justices Behind the Curtain, HARV. L. TODAY (Sept. 23,
2021),
https://today.law.harvard.edu/pay-no-attention-to-the-justices-behind-the-curtain/
[https://perma.cc/CU52-NHBJ] (noting that “the Court’s emergency orders are not ‘decisions,’
because the Court makes only procedural rulings rather than binding precedent on the shadow
docket”); but see Trevor N. McFadden & Vetan Kapoor, The Precedential Effects of the Supreme Court’s
Emergency Stays, 44 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 830–31 (2021) (arguing stays fall into three categories
in a precedential value spectrum).
48. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 960 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Those who
are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at our word. Not so today.”).
49. Id.; Brett LoGiurato, Female Justices Issue Scathing Dissent In The First Post-Hobby Lobby Birth
Control
Exemption,
BUS.
INSIDER
(July 3,
2014,
5:14 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/sotomayor-ginsburg-kagan-dissent-wheaton-college-decisionsupreme-court-2014-7 [https://perma.cc/DA3M-GY28].
50. Wheaton Coll., 573 U.S. at 960 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Schroeder, America’s, supra note 34,
at 877–84; Baude, supra note 34, at 15 (“The [Wheaton College] Court issued a four-paragraph unsigned
opinion that left the legal standard and its legal basis a mystery.”); see Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph
Stern, The Supreme Court Is Making Real Judges’ Jobs Extremely Difficult, SLATE (Feb. 14, 2022, 4:29 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/02/supreme-court-voting-rights-shadow-docketgaslighting.html (noting how the United States Supreme Court used the shadow docket to freeze an
injunction supported by a 225-page decision from a three judge panel without explanation).
51. Baude, supra note 34, at 5, 15 (“[I]n her Wheaton College dissent, Justice Sotomayor pointed
out that members of the majority had previously written that an injunction could issue only if the
plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief was ‘indisputably clear.’”); see, e.g., Barr v. Lee, 140 S. Ct. 2590, 2591–92
(2020) (per curiam); id. at 2594 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court forever deprives respondents
of their ability to press a constitutional challenge to their lethal injections, and prevents lower courts
from reviewing that challenge. All of that is at sharp odds with this Court’s own ruling mere months
earlier.”).
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it to violate federal law.52 Perhaps Wheaton College would have been the
natural progression after Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,53 but the
injunction prematurely ended litigation before the law could be changed to
actually justify the injunction.54
When district courts reversed certain controversial Trump policies,
naming them illegal or unconstitutional, the shadow docket was used to set
aside these decisions.55 This made the Court appear to boldly tamp down
on Trump policies on the record, while nothing happened in the practical
sense.56 Along these lines, state voting regulations to make voting easier

52. Wheaton Coll., 573 U.S. at 961 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that their order “block[ed]
the operation of a duly enacted law and regulations, in a case in which the courts below have not yet
adjudicated the merits of the applicant’s claims and in which those courts have declined requests for
similar injunctive relief”).
53. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
54. Wheaton Coll., 573 U.S. at 959, 961 (granting an injunction that allowed Wheaton College to
block its employees from accessing contraceptives that would have been paid for through their
insurance solely by the federal government); id. at 961 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see Hobby Lobby,
573 U.S. at 692 (noting that the law as it existed at the time of Wheaton College, under the ACA and
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations, employees of corporations that were granted
religious exemptions would “still have access to insurance coverage without cost sharing for all FDAapproved contraceptives” under the ACA and FDA regulations).
55. See Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 33, at 50 n.11 (noting the shadow docket’s role in
sidelining Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, a case that determined that the Migrant Protection Protocols were
unlawful, and how there was behavior similar to the Supreme Court’s shadow docket orders at the
district level in Ms. L v. ICE, where enforcement of an injunction previously granted was largely denied
likely based in part upon an Iqbal/Twombly dismissal of the suit it granted a preliminary injunction for);
see also El Paso Cty. v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d 655, 667 (2019) (“Defendants do not have compelling
reasons justifying an administrative stay of this decision as they have requested.”), stay granted pending
appeal El Paso County v. Trump, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 567, at *2–3 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(citing Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (mem.) (staying a similar Ninth Circuit injunction))
(demonstrating that the Circuit Courts engage in shadow docket behavior inspired by the U.S. Supreme
Court as well); Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 401 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[N]either we nor DHS can override
the clear statutory command that time and place information be included in all Notices to Appear.”),
rehearing granted by 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The three-judge panel disposition in this case shall
not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.”), order staying en banc proceedings pending
the issuance of an opinion by the United States Supreme Court in Niz-Chavez v. Barr, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18019 (9th Cir. 2020), petition granted, remanded, 998 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2021) (presumably lifting
the stay and ending en banc review after Niz-Chavez was decided, but failing to clarify whether Lopez v.
Barr may now be cited as good precedent as Niz-Chavez appears to have extended and strengthened
Pereira as well as the rationale of Lopez).
56. Supra note 55 and accompanying text; infra notes 57–64; Lithwick & Stern, supra note 50
(citing Singleton v. Merrill, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17362, *277 (N.D. Ala. 2022), stay granted by sub nom.
Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022)); cf. McFadden & Kapoor, supra note 47, at 866–68 (explaining
how stays override preliminary injunctions without engaging in the rigorous analysis of whether the
preliminary injunction was correctly granted).
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during COVID were reversed in the shadow docket without an actual law
or decision.57
The Court’s use of the shadow docket was also capable of speeding things
up.58 For example, the Court shut down several Eighth Amendment cases
in Barr v. Lee59 without a briefing, hearing, or evidence, which sped up
President Trump’s death penalty orders.60 Also, Ragbir v. Homan61 was
vacated under Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam,62 extending
Thuraissigiam to cases involving lawful permanent residents without a hearing
on the merits.63
Lee and Ragbir may seem exceptional, and yet they exemplify the United
States judiciary’s equity docket today.64 Nobody who went to law school
learned how to deal with anything in the realm of this sort of judicial abuse;
most lawyers still read the opinions on the record and reasonably presume
they control the Court’s decisions at equity.65 The mass denial or ignorance

57. See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1208 (2020)
(per curiam) (referencing “[t]he stay [as] granted pending final disposition of the appeal by United
States Court of Appeals”).
58. See, e.g., Barr v. Lee, 140 S. Ct. 2590, 2591–92 (2020) (per curiam) (vacating the lower court’s
preliminary injunction to allow for the death penalty to go forward as planned).
59. Id. at 2590.
60. Id. at 2591–92; see also Michael Tarm & Michael Kunzelman, Trump Administration Carries Out
13th and Final Execution, AP NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-wildlifecoronavirus-pandemic-crime-terre-haute-28e44cc5c026dc16472751bbde0ead50
[https://perma.cc/RC3V-RNTD] (detailing the federal executions of death row inmates under the
Trump Administration).
61. Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment vac’d sub nom. Pham v.
Ragbir, 141 S. Ct. 227 (2020).
62. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
63. Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 78, cert. granted, judgment vac’d sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, 141 S. Ct. 227
(2020) (exclusively citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam to vacate Ragbir while granting a writ of
certiorari).
64. See Lawrence Hurly et al., The ‘Shadow Docket’: How the U.S. Supreme Court Quietly Dispatches
Key Rulings, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2021, 5:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-usa-courtshadow-video/the-shadow-docket-how-the-u-s-supreme-court-quietly-dispatches-key-rulings-idUSK
BN2BF16Q [https://perma.cc/3PAR-3U8H] (“[T]he short-circuit approach, intended only for
emergencies, isn’t reserved for death penalty cases. It has, in the last four years, significantly changed
the way the high court does business.”).
65. Barnett, supra note 47 (demonstrating a clear lack of consensus about the shadow docket,
and a lack of direction for students to follow); see Nina Totenberg, Justice Alito Calls Criticism of
the Shadow Docket ‘Silly’ and ‘Misleading’, NPR (Sept. 30, 2021, 7:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2021/09/30/1042051134/justice-alito-calls-criticism-of-the-shadow-docket-silly-and-misleading
[https://perma.cc/N8TE-CL4C] (referencing Justice Kagan’s criticism of the “shadow docket” and
how it “may depart from the usual principles of appellate process”).
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among lawyers of shadow dockets in America may be the sole basis of their
existence.66
As in Ragbir, in conjunction with a grant of certiorari, the Court now
issues small orders along with the grant of certiorari, like mini-decisions.67
For example, in Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute,68 the Court reversed
the Second Circuit decisions involving the president’s use of Twitter as
moot.69 Killing an opinion made when a case was ripe without offering a
reason or hearing arguments about mootness is a radical waste of judicial
resources.70
Further, in Knight First Amendment Institute, Justice Thomas wrote a long
“concurrence” defending Donald Trump’s abuses of Twitter.71 Thomas
appeared to blame Congress for allowing Twitter to violate Trump’s right
of free speech after Trump used Twitter to incite lawless violence at the
Capitol Building that is located directly across the street from the U.S.
Supreme Court —this opinion was then cited favorably in a 2022 shadow
docket dissent in Netchoice, LLC v. Paxton in which Justice Alito argued that
a controversial Texas law HB20 that appeared to be aimed at granting
Thomas’s wishes should go into force prior to being adjudicated.72 Thus,
66. Barnett, supra note 47 (explaining that major shadow docket decisions like “an emergency
stay of a Florida district court opinion in a case that essentially disenfranchised approximately 800,000
ex-felons before the 2020 presidential election” resulted “with significantly less fanfare” than Whole
Woman’s Health and Barr v. Lee). This suggests that the legal community and public’s ignorance and
denial of the full extent of shadow docket activity may be the primary factor that keeps the shadow
docket going. Id.
67. Supra note 63
68. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021).
69. Id. at 1220–21 (“The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.”).
70. Id.; Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 78 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment vac’d sub nom. Pham
v. Ragbir, 141 S. Ct. 227 (2020).
71. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1227 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing, in the wake of
the January 6, 2021 insurrection according to which Twitter decided to block Trump from its platform
that he used to encourage people to storm the Capitol Building, that “the more glaring concern must
perforce be the dominant digital platforms themselves . . . the right to cut off speech lies most
powerfully in the hands of private digital platforms”).
72. Id.; Id., cited by Netchoice, LLC v. Paxton, No. 21A720, slip op. at 4 (2022) (Alito, J.,
dissenting); Twitter, Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension
[https://perma.cc/Q2MV6A92] (explaining Twitter’s reasons for banning Donald Trump from Twitter for violating its
“Glorification of Violence policy” by making publishing tweets that “can be mobilized by different
audiences, including to incite violence”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 451 (1969) (noting that
“incitement of imminent lawless action” is not protected under the First Amendment); cf. Kate Conger,
Jack Dorsey Says Twitter Played a Role in U.S. Capitol Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2021),

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss3/1

12

Schroeder: The Dark Side of Due Process: Part II
SCHROEDER II_STEP 5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART II

2/20/2022 9:53 AM

661

Justice Thomas used the shadow docket to make his political druthers public
at an extremely imprudent time for the Court itself, and perhaps the most
telling fact of all, was that nobody on the Court balked at it—Thomas’s
concurrence was considered business as usual until the news noted its
oddity.73 Then, Justice Alito publicly defended the Court’s shadow docket
generally, stating that criticizing such bad judicial behavior is “silly,” even
though “good behavior” is expressly required of all federal judges by the
United States Constitution.74
Thomas’s current views are unsurprising because they are merely
Justice Holmes’s marketplace of ideas reborn.75 If the Supreme Court’s
embrace of Holmes’s marketplace of ideas can justify burning crosses,76
Nazi marches,77 and the Charlottesville protests,78 then perhaps toppling
the Capitol is also a legitimate expression of free speech.79 Democracy may,
as Justice Holmes theorized, need to survive in the brutal marketplace; if it
falls, it is merely proof of its weakness; its lack of fitness for a “free”
society.80
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/business/jack-dorsey-twitter-capitol-riot.html
[https://perma.cc/AVZ7-C7HB] (“Jack Dorsey [is] Twitter’s chief executive . . . .”).
73. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1227 (decided on April 5, 2021, almost three months
to the day after the insurrection); Berin Szóka & Corbin Barthold, Justice Thomas’s Misguided Concurrence
on Platform Regulation, LAWFARE (Apr. 14, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/justicethomass-misguided-concurrence-platform-regulation [https://perma.cc/72N3-TSLS] ; cf. Jane Mayer,
Is Ginni Thomas a Threat to the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Jan. 21, 2022),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/01/31/is-ginni-thomas-a-threat-to-the-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/7EQB-XY2B] (“Many Americans first became aware of Ginni Thomas’s activism
on January 6, 2021.”).
74. Totenberg, supra note 65; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges “shall hold their
offices during good Behaviour.”).
75. Compare Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1223–27 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing
the marketplace of ideas under common carrier common law and the problems with Twitter’s “right
to cut off speech” that “lies most powerfully in the hands of private digital platforms”), with Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“the best test of truth is to the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”).
76. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 364 (2003) (Opinion of O’Connor, J.).
77. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (per curiam).
78. Id.; Steven R. Shapiro, Reflections on Charlottesville, 14 STAN. J. CIV. RIGHTS & CIV. LIBERTIES
45, 50 (2018) (arguing that, according to the old marketplace of ideas theory, “the remedy for speech
is ‘more speech, not enforced silence’”) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
79. See Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1227 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]hether a
government actor violated the First Amendment by blocking another Twitter user.”).
80. Abrams, 250 U.S at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science
and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 449 (1899) [hereinafter Holmes, Jr., Law in Science]
(demonstrating “a lively example of the struggle for life among competing ideas, and of the ultimate
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Holmes was hardly consistent about First Amendment rights.81 He
wrote the majority in several decisions favoring state power over free
speech,82 before dissenting in Abrams v. United States,83 only to return to the
majority again in Whitney v. California.84 The Warren Court’s attempted
correctives for Abrams were not enough85 because Holmes’s decision in
Schenck v. United States86 was extended to try whistleblowers like Chelsea
Manning and Reality Winner ever since.87 Holmes’s rejection of a strong
First Amendment right to be a whistleblower infamously enabled the neglect
of Dawn Wooten when she blew the whistle on nonconsensual sterilizations
occurring in immigrant detention centers.88

victory and survival of the strongest”); id. at 456–57 (naming his preference for laws over facts and
bright line rules over judges that lack a sufficient backbone to strike forth); Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918) [hereinafter Holmes, Jr., Natural Law] (referring to
preexisting natural rights as the mere product of “fighting . . . to maintain them,” rather than an actual
reality established by God or nature, concluding disparagingly about natural rights, “A dog will fight
for its bone.”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 238 (1881) (“The possession of
rights, as it is called, has been a fighting-ground for centuries . . . .”).
81. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Trial of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 217
(1994) (noting that “[i]n cases like Debs [Holmes was] the great oppressor, and then later in Abrams and
other cases, [Holmes was] the great emancipator,” and also emphasizing that Holmes did not consider
himself as being inconsistent at all—Holmes believed he was being consistent).
82. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214–17 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204, 206 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
462 (1907).
83. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624–30 (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
672–73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 486 (1920) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 271 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
84. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); id. at 380
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“MR. JUSTICE HOLMES joins in this opinion.”); cf. Smolla, supra note 81,
at 216–17 (highlighting Holmes’s inconsistencies).
85. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 451 (1969) (citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
86 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
87. See Joshua Nevett, Daniel Ellsberg: The 90-year-old Whistleblower Tempting Prosecution, BBC NEWS
(June 7, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57341592 [https://perma.cc/JWG8AK9A] (connecting Schenck with Ellsberg, Snowden, and other whistleblowers); cf. Daniel Ellsberg,
Daniel Ellsberg: Snowden Would Not Get a Fair Trial—and Kerry is Wrong, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2014,
7:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/30/daniel-ellsberg-snowdenfair-trial-kerry-espionage-act [https://perma.cc/M7T4-4SFL].
88 David Remnick, The Trials of a Whistle-blower, NEW YORKER RADIO HOUR (Jan. 21, 2022),
https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/the-new-yorker-radio-hour/the-trials-of-a-whistle-blower
[https://perma.cc/R6KQ-49Z4] (containing reporter Sarah Stillman’s interview with Dawn
Wooten).
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However, as bad as this is and by great contrast, Justices Brandeis and
Holmes did not take the lead in Near v. Minnesota,89 which established a firm
prohibition on prior restraints of speech.90 The Warren Court extended
Near in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,91 which was extended again in New
York Times Co. v. United States.92 The mixed result was that, although
whistleblowers like Snowden would still likely face jail time under the
Espionage Act if they were caught,93 and Ms. Wooten’s bosses can
professionally exile those who reveal their crimes,94 newspapers could
openly publish materials exposed by whistleblowers.95
The Court’s recent overemphasis of Holmes’s marketplace of ideas,96
which had no role in Near,97 seemed to come from a fundamental
misunderstanding of Holmes’s statement in Lochner v. New York98 that the
United States Constitution “does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statics.”99 Most jurists assumed this line meant that Holmes was against
reading economic theories into the Constitution.100 But this cannot be true,
because Holmes read John Stuart Mill’s economic theory into the First

89. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
90. Id. at 733 (extrapolating a First Amendment restriction on prior restraints on the freedom
of speech from Joseph Story’s Commentaries at § 1874); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931).
91. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 75 (1963).
92. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); see also Org. for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971) (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 697).
93. Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217; see Ellsberg, supra note 87; Spencer Ackerman & Ed
Pilkington, Obama’s War on Whistleblowers Leaves Administration Insiders Unscathed, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 16, 2015, 3:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/16/whistleblowersdouble-standard-obama-david-petraeus-chelsea-manning [https://perma.cc/DW2U-UV9H].
94. Remnick, supra note 88.
95. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
96. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989)); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418–19 (1989) (citing Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
97. Near, 283 U.S. at 632–633 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874).
98. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
99. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 696 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lochner,
198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see id. at 705–06 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“As Judge Henry
Friendly once put it, echoing Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty any more than it enacts Hebert Spencer’s Social Statics.”); cf.
O’Connor, They Often, supra note 28, at 385 (“[Justice Holmes] taught us that . . . the Constitution ‘does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.’”).
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Amendment when he established the marketplace of ideas ideology in
Abrams.101
Under a generous reading of recent opinions protecting the speech of the
Ku Klux Klan (KKK),102 white supremacists,103 and homophobes,104 one
may hope that the same rules would be applied equally to civil rights leaders,
free speech advocates, and ordinary citizens.105 But this hope was dashed
repeatedly.106 The rulings that favor bad men are not normally extended
to protect anyone else, and even when they are, there is a palpable double
standard slanted in favor of the bad.107

101. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Jill Gordon, John Stuart Mill and the
“Marketplace of Ideas,” 23 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 235, 241 (1997); Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and
Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE
J. L. & HUMANS. 35, 61–62 (2010); Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 19.
102. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003) (Opinion of O’Connor, J.).
103. Id. (Opinion of O’Connor, J.); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43,
44 (1977) (per curiam).
104. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).
105. See Mckesson v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 48, 50 (2020) (per curiam) (noting a police officer injured
as a result of an unknown person’s violence attempted to sue a single civil rights leader whose speech
they hate—the Fifth Circuit did not shut down the judicial circus aimed at ending DeRay Mckesson’s
involvement in civil rights movements prior to this decision).
106. See THE INTERNET’S OWN BOY: THE STORY OF AARON SWARTZ 1:30:50 (Participant
Media 2014) (discussing the unjust prosecution of Aaron Swartz under 18 U.S.C. § 1343); WAR
MACHINE (Netflix 2017) (explaining reporter Michael Hastings’ role in ousting Stanley McChrystal
after embedding himself in McChrystal’s inner circle); cf. Max Kennerly, Esq., Examining the Outrageous
Aaron Swartz Indictment for Computer Fraud, LITIG. & TRIAL (July 19, 2011),
https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/07/articles/series/special-comment/aaron-swartzcomputer-fraud-indictment/ [https://perma.cc/L8W8-DAD3] (providing context to the prosecution
of Aaron Swartz); Jason Howerton, Police Have Said Some Weird Stuff About Reporter Michael Hastings’ Car
Crash, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 23, 2013, 4:05 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-we-nowknow-about-michael-hastings-mysterious-car-crash-2013-7
[https://perma.cc/D5EA-B6AM]
(considering the suspicious death of Michael Hastings after criticizing U.S. military officials).
107. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919); cf. Ackerman & Pilkington, supra
note 93 (describing the double standard normally applied in such cases). The double-standard in this
area is perhaps clearest when considering the way Jeffrey Toobin acquired and almost exposed
government secrets for profit compared with Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, and Reality Winner
whose lives were ruined after whistleblowing for no profit. See Mike Masnick, Reporter Toobin Lashes
Out at Reporters Who Use ‘Stolen’ Documents; Leaves out His Own History of Doing the Same, TECHDIRT
(Aug. 26,
2013,
3:50
PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20130826/12565024316/are-old-school-journalists-more-upset-about-leaks-about-their-own-failuresobsolescence.shtml [https://perma.cc/TPN9-RR9F].
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Perhaps the Supreme Court is not meant to distinguish between good or
bad, because that is a moral judgment imprudent for judges to exercise.108
This is why we must abide by the principles that underlie the First
Amendment rather than our personal moral proclivities.109 However,
Justice Holmes and the parade of marketplace of ideas rulings that followed
after him pointedly departed from the principles for which the founders
ratified the First Amendment.110
The marketplace of ideas was invented by the utilitarians,111 purveyors
of rationalist philosophy,112 whose leader Jeremy Bentham was staunchly
opposed to the American idea of rights.113 The Benthamite plan was to
divorce rights from morality by presuming that as long as humans are free
to say what they like, progress in society would eventually materialize.114
But the presumption of automatic progress was a mere guise for panoptic
fantasies.115
The First Amendment did not guarantee progress, nor did it have the
purpose of divorcing the freedom of speech from morality.116 The authors
108. See David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s The Path
of The Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1548 (1997) (“Holmes briskly and brutally demolishes law’s claim
to occupy the moral or logical high ground”).
109. Id. at 1551 (“[T]he only path he mentions in the speech itself is ‘the narrow path of legal
doctrine,’ bounded by the twin pitfalls of morality and logic.”) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
110. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
111. Ten Cate, supra note 101, at 61–62; Blasi, supra note 101, at 19.
112. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 377–78, 381 (2011) (using Bentham’s
brand of utilitarianism as a baseline for studying Rationalist ideology since it is so basic, based on pain
and pleasure).
113. Jeremy Bentham, Short Review of the Declaration, in JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN LIND, AN
ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 131–32 (1776).
114. Ten Cate, supra note 101, at 74 (“For Mill, reason, checked by experience, allows humans
to rise above the arbitrary circumstances that resulted in their initial convictions, and provides the key
to overcoming prejudices and achieving progress.”). But see KAHNEMAN, supra note 112, at 377–78,
381 (approaching a complete debunking of Mill and Bentham’s hope that reason could accurately be
informed by human experience).
115. JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON iii, 122 (1791) (claiming Bentham’s utopic madness was
in full bloom in France during the French Revolution, by which he claimed a magical utopia would
emerge by his theories, “Morals reformed, health preserved, industry invigorated, instruction diffused,
public burdens lightened, economy seated as it were upon a rock, the Gordian knot of the Poor-laws
not cut but untied—all by a simple idea in architecture[!]”); cf. DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE 316–24
(2013) (symbolizing Benthamite Utopians as a vicious shark that devours everything, and
demonstrating how Americans’ faith in automatic progress leads to opening the door for this shark to
devour everything).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I; infra notes 119–120. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac
McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) (“[H]e who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
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of the First Amendment followed in the tradition of Ciceronian Skeptic
Idealism featured in Cicero’s De Divination and De Natura Deorum.117 Thus,
while they doubted whether they could attain absolute universals like those
in Plato’s heaven, they nevertheless decided to hold onto the gods.118
The founders, from Thomas Jefferson in the South to Isaac Backus in the
North, relied upon Roger Williams’s contribution and found two purposes
of First Amendment freedoms.119 The first purpose of the First
Amendment was to increase the chances that humanity might find the
truth.120 The pursuit of truth protected by the First Amendment is neither
absolute nor relative, but it is a right to express the truth as one sees it
regarding specific beliefs, facts, or circumstances.121
The second purpose of the First Amendment is to foster peace by
lessening the felt need to appeal to violence.122 Again, the pursuit of peace
allowed under the First Amendment is neither absolute nor relative.123
Rather, it is a practical peace created by allowing worship, gatherings, and

lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. [T]hat ideas
should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man,
and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature,
when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density at any point;
and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement ore
exclusive appropriation.”).
117. See, e.g., ELIHU S. RILEY, CORRESPONDENCE OF “FIRST CITIZEN”—CHARLES CARROLL
OF CARROLLTON, AND “ANTILON”—DANIEL DULANY, JR., 1773 196 (1902) (quoting and translating
Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.2.4–5) (“Groundless opinions are destroyed, but rational judgments, or the
judgments of nature, are confirmed by time.”).
118. Id.; see Cicero, De Divinatione 2.17.41 (“[I]t is evident that divination has been destroyed and
yet we must hold on to the gods.”).
119. Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom 5 [1777] (“[T]ruth is great and will
prevail if left to herself”); Isaac Backus, Truth is Great, and Will Prevail 3–5 [1781]; Isaac Backus,
An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty 25–26 [1773] (quoting ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY
TENENT MADE YET MORE BLOODY 192 (1652) [hereinafter WILLIAMS II]).
120. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE AND
CONSCIENCE 1, 3 (1644) [hereinafter WILLIAMS I] (beginning a conversation between the two purposes
of truth and peace ordained by God through freedom of speech: “It is the will and command of God,
that (since the comming his Sonne the Lord Jesus) a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or
Antichristian consciences and worships, bee granted to all men in all Nations and Countries: and they are onely
to bee fought against with that Sword which is only (in Soule matters) able to conquer, to wit, the Sword of
Gods Spirit, the Word of God.”); id. at 273 (rejecting Hobbesian “force or fraud” as the antithesis of the
peace and truth established by God through natural freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion).
121. WILLIAMS I, supra note 120, at 1, 273.
122. Id. at 1, 372 (“the two-edged Sword of the Spirit . . . hang[s] not about the loines or side, but at
the lips”); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
123. See supra note 119; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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speech so that rather than engaging in religious wars, individuals can
peacefully try their disputes in the court of public opinion.124
Curiously, these two purposes seem to be the opposite of Hobbes’s two
bases of statecraft—force and fraud.125 The First Amendment is not
supposed to protect fighting words,126 nor fraudulent statements.127
These two categories of speech are not supposed to be protected, because
they tend toward violence and the proliferation of lies, which undercuts the
exact purposes of ratifying the First Amendment.128
Justice Holmes’s marketplace of ideas, however, opened the door to
protecting force and fraud as legitimate free speech.129 His other opinions
regarding the Espionage Act and state syndication laws allowed merciless
prosecutions.130 One direct result of failing to correct Holmes’s errors in
free speech cases, which slanted the courts toward punishing the good and
exonerating the bad, was the failed presidency of Donald J. Trump.131
President Trump got on Twitter, invited thousands to join him in
Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021, and proceeded to attempt a coup
124. See supra notes 119, 123.
125. Compare JAMES OTIS, COLLECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES OTIS 241 (Richard
Samuelson ed., 2015) (disputing “Hobbesian maxims” including “[t]hat dominion is rightfully founded
on force and fraud”), with WILLIAMS I, supra note 120, at 273 (“God hath given them the spirit of
slumber, eyes that they should not see, &c. all which must be spoken of the very conscience, which he
that hath the golden key of David can only shut and open, and all the Picklocks or Swords in all the
Smiths shops in the World can neither by force or fraud prevent his time.”).
126. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942), extended and quoted by Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 385 (1974) (explaining that the First Amendment does not preclude
the government from punishing citizens for saying ‘“fighting’ words—those which by their very
utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite immediate breach of the peace’).
127. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274, 289–90 (1964), extended and quoted by
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339–40 (“But there is no constitutional value in false statement of fact. Neither the
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open’ debate on public issues.”); cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (describing laws that would have a chilling effect on speech as a violation of free speech).
128. See supra notes 121–22, 125.
129. Supra note 96; see Ten Cate, supra note 101, at 56–59 (noting how “Holmes’s deference to
dominant forces” opened up the possibility of “violent upset[s]”—“Holmes’s appreciation of a battle
is reflected in the reference to the ‘competition of the market’ in the Abrams dissent.”); id at 65–68
(noting “Holmes’s references to the truth . . . are ‘puzzling’” because Holmes doubted the human
capacity to know truth—his solution was to see what truth could get itself accepted in the marketplace,
which necessarily opened the door to fraud, and because Holmes’s views about how little one could
know of the truth, it opened the door very widely to fraud).
130. Supra note 82.
131. See supra note 71–80 and accompanying text; see also Thomas B. Edsall, Have Trump’s Lies
Wrecked Free Speech?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/opinion/
trump-lies-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/MVD8-8MVB].
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d’état.132 Trump, as of now, likely will not be prosecuted for his online
speech because Holmes’s marketplace of ideas protects him.133 The reason
why Eugene Debs was found guilty under the Espionage Act and Donald J.
Trump likely never will, was triumphally exemplified by Justice Thomas in
his recent Twitter rant in Knight First Amendment Institute.134
Rather than bring Trump to justice for his role in the events of January 6,
2021, the United States Supreme Court is focused on delivering on the
political goals of the former president.135 In only the first year after
Trump’s presidency ended, the Supreme Court nullified Roe v. Wade in the
shadow docket.136 The nullification did not overrule Roe, but was rather a
failure of federal equitable enforcement of Roe against a Texas law that
clearly violated it.137
In short, the Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson138 Court drew Ex parte
Young139 into question for the first time, and with it, the power of the Court
to enforce federal standards on the states.140
“Young,” as
Chief Justice Rehnquist once remarked, “gives life to the Supremacy
Clause.”141 The Young decision arose in opposition to federal railroad

132. Amy Sherman, A timeline of What Trump Said Before Jan. 6 Capitol Riot, POLITIFACT (Jan. 11,
2021), https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/jan/11/timeline-what-trump-said-jan-6-capitol-riot/
[https://perma.cc/NN38-SQTG].
133. S.V. Date, Trump May Get Away With Obstruction Of Congress. Again., HUFFPOST (Oct. 13,
2021, 4:05 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-obstruction-january-6_n_616726b0e4b0f3
be08ddf8be [https://perma.cc/KP6A-FJ8V].
134. Supra notes 71–72; cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (allowing the
government to administer punishments of speech that is an “incitement of imminent lawless action”).
135. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021); Biden v. Knight
First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1227 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring). Texas v. Biden,
No. 2:21-CV-067-Z, 2021 WL 3603341, at *27–28 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (finding termination of the
Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) violated the Administrative Procedures Act, and enjoining the
Biden administration from ending it through an executive memorandum), application for stay denied,
142 S. Ct. 926, 927 (2021) (mem.) (citing DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S Ct. 1891 (2020));
Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986, 989–91 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the MPP were unlawful
and violated the Administrative Procedures Act, and enjoining Trump to set aside the MPP), application
for stay granted, 140 S. Ct. 1564 (2020), vacated as moot sub nom. Mayorkas v. Innovation Law Lab, 141 S.
Ct. 2842 (2021).
136. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2494.
139. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
140. Whole Woman’s Health, 141 S. Ct. at 2495.
141. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
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standards, and if it had gone the opposite way, the United States may have
created fifty separate railroad systems rather than one.142
Upon the basis of equitable power expressed in Young, the United States
was able to administer an interstate highway system, a telecommunications
system which is the backbone of the internet, civil rights and voting
standards, healthcare standards, national immigration standards, and several
other nationwide standards of law.143 If Young is ever overruled, all these
systems would be in jeopardy of nullification in the same way as Roe.144 The
Court may choose not to overrule everything Young stands for, but it appears
that the Court today is not afraid to pick and choose which laws it feels are
worthy of Young’s protections.145
It is as if the Whole Woman’s Health Court has fully endorsed the deplorable
antics of the twice disgraced Alabama Supreme Court Justice, Roy
Moore.146 State legislatures and private actors may choose, in the style of
former Justice Moore, to abide by only the federal standards they feel the
current United States Supreme Court will support.147 If five justices seem
likely not to support a single issue like abortion or gun regulations, the states

142. Young, 209 U.S. at 128.
143. See, e.g., Green, 474 U.S. at 68 (“Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal
law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.”).
144. Id. at 68; Whole Woman’s Health, 141 S. Ct. at 2495.
145. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health, 141 S. Ct. at 2495 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163
(1908)) (“Nor is it clear whether, under existing precedent, this Court can issue an injunction against
state judges asked to decide a lawsuit under Texas’ law.”); Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 959
(2014).
146. Compare Whole Woman’s Health, 141 S. Ct. at 2495 (seemingly deciding when and when not
to apply judicial precedent), with Roy S. Moore, Administrative Order of the Chief Justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court 4 (2016) (attempting to block the United States Supreme Court’s opinion Obergefell v.
Hodges from taking effect in Alabama).
147. See, e.g., Second Amendment Preservation Act, 2021 Mo. HB 85, § 1.430 (enacted)
(“All federal acts, laws, executive orders, administrative orders, rules, and regulations, regardless of
whether they were enacted before or after the provisions of section 1.410 to 1.485, that infringe on the
people’s right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri shall be invalid to this state,
shall not be recognized by this state, shall be specifically rejected by this state, and shall not be enforced
by this state.”). Cf. Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court to hear restrictive Mississippi abortion law on December 1,
CNN POLITICS (Sept. 20, 2021, 9:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/20/politics/supremecourt-mississippi-abortion-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/DXH5-PEBK]; Norah O’Donnell,
Missouri’s Second Amendment Preservation Act Outlaws Local Enforcement of Federal Gun Laws, CBS:
60 MINUTES (Nov. 7, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/missouri-gun-law-second-amend
ment-preservation-act-60-minutes-2021-11-07/ [https://perma.cc/DXH5-PEBK].
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may now wager that the federal court will treat settled federal standards as
unenforceable before a hearing on the merits.148
It appears that, even after Trump, there are not yet five justices willing
reverse course on gay marriage.149 However, the Court does have at least
five justices willing to treat the Eighth Amendment,150 Roe v. Wade,151
immigrant rights,152 and voting rights as unenforceable.153 The recent
legislation on these tense political issues in Republican controlled states,
previously protected by the federal courts, is unsurprising, but it is also
unsettling for the future role, if any, of general, efficacious federal standards
of law in American life.154
B. THE WITNESS OF KELLI DILLON: HOW BRANDEIS’S IDEA OF PRIVACY
RENDERED ITSELF MOOT
In the deepest night, when even the moon has set, “There is no light in
earth or heaven / But the cold light of stars.”155 According to Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow, in such a darkness “the first watch of night is given

148. See Second Amendment Preservation Act, 2021 Mo. HB 85, § 1.430 (enacted) (providing
a statute by the Missouri legislation that rejects “[a]ll federal acts, laws, executive orders, administrative
orders, rules, and regulations” infringing the Second Amendment); see, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. DOL, OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 663 (2022) (per curiam) (“Agreeing that applicants are likely to prevail,
we grant their applications and stay the rule.”).
149. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1736–37 (2020) (noting only three Justices
dissented with the majority opinion protecting gay rights). But see Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021) (holding the city’s interests in protecting same-sex adoptive parents was
not compelling enough to overcome adoptive agency’s free exercise interests).
150. Barr v. Lee, 140 S. Ct. 2590, 2591–92 (2020). But see Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 691
(2019) (clarifying the state’s responsibility with respect to the Eighth Amendment).
151. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021).
152. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020); Texas v. Biden,
No. 2:21-CV-067-Z, 2021 WL 3603341, at *27–28 (N.D. Tex. 2021), application for stay denied, 142 S. Ct.
926, 927 (2021) (mem.) (citing DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S Ct. 1891 (2020)); Innovation
Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986, 989–91 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the MPP were unlawful and
violated the Administrative Procedures Act, and enjoining Trump to set aside the MPP), application for
stay granted, 140 S. Ct. 1564 (2020), vacated as moot sub nom. Mayorkas v. Innovation Law Lab, 141 S. Ct.
2842 (2021).
153. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–67 (2013).
154. See Dahlia Lithwick, The Conservative Justices’ Reasoning in the Texas Abortion Case Is Legal
Mansplaining, SLATE (Sept. 2, 2021), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/09/conservativejustices-abortion-legal-mansplaining.html [https://perma.cc/S8E3-JYYC] (“[T]he U.S. Supreme
Court ended 50 years of abortion rights in Texas without full briefing or oral argument[.]”).
155. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Light of Stars [1839].
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/ To the red planet of Mars.”156 This first watch was not a “star of love
and dreams,” but a “star of the unconquered will,”
O star of strength! I see thee stand
And smile upon my pain;
Thou beckonest with thy mailed hand,
And I am strong again.157

And so, we see this spirit of strength in Kelli Dillon, who traveled through
such dark nights in America.158 She was forced into the shadows of a
rehabilitated eugenics program in California.159 Without knowing exactly
how these systems were unleashed upon her, she nevertheless set about to
blow them apart with the help of her notoriously bejeweled advocate
Cynthia Chandler.160
It is an open secret on the liberal wing of the bench that Mathews v.
Eldridge161 is a redux of Buck v. Bell.162 The false hope of Justice O’Connor
kept this open fact secret with statements such as: “The Court has never
cited Buck v. Bell, for instance, as support for any important proposition.”163
O’Connor maintained a hopeful ruse, “this part of Holmes’s jurisprudence
has [indeed] become ‘obscure’—it may still be recalled, but it no longer
possesses any vitality.”164

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Compare id., with BELLY OF THE BEAST 16:50 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020). (telling the story of
Kelli Dillon, the difficulties she faced in prison, and her choice to rise above).
159. BELLY OF THE BEAST 16:50 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020).
160. Id. at 1:15:14–1:15:35.
161. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
162. BELLY OF THE BEAST 48:05–49:00 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (Californian eugenicists “had
always used cost/benefit as the justifier for why they were doing what they were doing”); Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (extending a Jacobson balancing test “to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes”);
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347–48 (expanding a cost/benefit balancing test to cover potentially all procedural
due process claims); Phillip Thompson, Silent Protest: A Catholic Justice Dissents in Buck v. Bell,
43 CATHOLIC LAWYER 125, 131–32 (2004) (“In Buck v. Bell, the court employed a utilitarian calculus
of weighing costs and benefits to determine the Virginia legislation’s appropriateness.”); see Cass R.
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1059–60 (2000) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Cognition] (attempting to vindicate cost/benefit balancing tests after then-Senator Biden
rebuked then-Supreme Court nominee Stephen Breyer as “incredibly presumptuous and elitist” for
endorsing cost/benefit balancing tests).
163. O’Connor, They Often, supra note 28, at 390.
164. Id. at 390–91.
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O’Connor was incorrect.165 Buck was cited for propositions in several
cases, including Justice Brandeis’s influential dissent in Olmstead v. United
States166 that gave birth to Griswold v. Connecticut’s167 penumbral rights
theory,168 Roe v. Wade expressly vindicated Buck,169 and Buck was directly
applied in Madrigal v. Quilligan.170 In fact, Buck’s due process framework
was implicitly revitalized by Mathews and perhaps came to define O’Connor’s
era more than any other law.171
As discussed in The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I, Justice Holmes
dissented with Brandeis in Olmstead, but disagreed with Brandeis’s assertion
of constitutional rights arising from the “penumbra.”172 The metaphor that
human rights are like spectral shadows emanating from the law, rather than
preexisting the law as the basis of United States government, was invented
by Holmes, author of Buck v. Bell, to undercut human rights.173 Thus, the
Griswold penumbral rights theory originated as a rejection of rights in
Olmstead, an inauspicious beginning.174
We can now see the penumbral forms of Holmes’s version of “due”
process emerging like the tentacles of a Leviathan wrapped around United
States citizens like Ms. Dillon to crush them in a paradox.175 However,

165. Buck, 274 U.S. at 200, cited in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 101 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that “the limited stature” of
abortion rights in Roe v. Wade “is evident from the fact that at the same time [the Court sought to
protect a fundamental right of women] the Court reaffirmed its initial decision in Buck v. Bell”).
166. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
167. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 379 (1965).
168. Id. at 494 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Olmstead, 277 U.S.
at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments covers the defendant . . . .”).
169. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (using Buck to limit women’s right to abortion).
170. Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. 75–2057, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20423, at *1 (9th Cir. 1978).
171. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), extended by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
347–48 (1976), extended by Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
172. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469–70 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I am not
prepared to say that the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant . . . .
But I think, as Mr. Justice BRANDEIS says, that apart from the Constitution the government ought
not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act.”).
173. Id.
174. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 379, 485 (1965) (emphasizing the penumbra metaphor
was taken from Holmes even though Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent is later cited as the origin).
175. BELLY OF THE BEAST 27:47 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (citing the supposed “cost
effectiveness” of using sterilization as nonconsensual birth control as the reason why women were
being sterilized against their will in California women’s prisons); cf. Pauli Murray, An American Credo,
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momentary cries for justice like those hurled by Ms. Chandler flashed like
bolts of lightning over the sea to expose the beast to us, so that we might
“reach the heart of the monster” in time to save ourselves.176 In response
to Ms. Chandler’s alarm, this subsection is intended as a light shining directly
into the penumbral laws of the United States.177
We believed so blindly in the inherent rationality of judges that it came as
a shock when Kelli Dillon uncovered a eugenic sterilization program in
California.178 California officially banned eugenic sterilization in 1979, in
the wake of a failure of federal courts to rein in the practice in the infamous
decision of Madrigal v. Quilligan.179 More recently, in an attempt to reform
a broken prison system, California prisons were placed in a federal
receivership.180
After learning about Ms. Dillon’s unwanted oophorectomy, Ms. Chandler
directly questioned the federal receiver regarding the existence of eugenic
sterilization in California.181 While the Supreme Court itself affirmed the
California receivership with the best of intentions, Ms. Chandler revealed
1945 COMMON GROUND 23 (referring to racism as an American Leviathan, writing: “Its tentacles will
engulf us unless we reach the heart of the monster.”).
176. BELLY OF THE BEAST 27:47 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (presenting whistleblower evidence
of the minutes of a California Department of Corrections committee meeting received by Cynthia
Chandler to corroborate that sterilizations were in fact being performed on women like Kelli Dillon
without their consent based on a cost/benefit analyses); Murray, supra note 175, at 23; see Clint
Schemmer, GCC, UMW to Screen Film on Forced Sterilization of Women in Prison, THE FREE LANCE-STAR
(Mar. 27,
2021),
https://fredericksburg.com/
news/local/gcc-umw-to-screen-film-on-forced-sterilization-of-women-in-prison/article_fc54f112-60
cd-5093-9e29-d2d08376d5e2.html [https://perma.cc/LG7C-DM2C].
177. Murray, supra note 175, at 23; Schemmer, supra note 176.
178. BELLY OF THE BEAST 16:50 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020).
179. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24210(b)(1) (noting that “state-sponsored sterilization
conducted pursuant to eugenics laws . . . existed in the State of California between 1909 and 1979”);
Alexandra Minna Stern, Sterilized in the Name of Public Health: Race, Immigration, and Reproductive Control in
Modern California, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1128, 1128–30 (2005) (explaining that in 1979 “Calif.
Assemblyman Art Torres . . . introduced a bill to the legislature to repeal the state’s sterilization law”
after he learned about the miscarriage of justice in Madrigal v. Quilligan—Assemblyman Torres’s law
banning eugenic sterilization in California became the law).
180. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 543 (2011) (affirming the constitutionality of the lower
court’s decision to place California prisons in a federal receivership).
181. BELLY OF THE BEAST 27:58–28:40 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (“Federal and state laws
prohibit sterilizing people in prison for the purpose of birth control, but they were doing it anyway.
So we sent a list of questions to the federal receivership. The whole job of that office is to make sure
the laws are followed in healthcare/delivery in the prisons. One of the questions was how they in fact
started sterilizing women during labor and delivery, and the response was that “yes” they were doing
that at two women’s prisons. This was signed by the federal receiver himself. And could he be so
clueless that he wouldn’t even know that he had just, like, stuck his foot in his mouth?”).
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that the receiver knew about and appeared to endorse California’s
sterilization program.182 Though Ms. Dillon wrought a change in California
Law in 2021 to make reparations to victims like her, there is still much to be
done,
[N]ow that there’s been a small victory they’re blocking advocates or anyone
who’s coming in from the outside from being able to come in freely to
interview inmates. There are women today that need reproductive care but
absolutely cannot get it because of the retaliation. The doctor told me, ‘thanks
to your fellow inmates, I’m not doing nothing.’ . . . None of the CDCR
[California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] doctors or officials
faced consequences for their actions. CDCR declined interview requests, but
issued a statement noting ‘an enhanced focus on women’s health’ since the
bill passed.183

And so, after Ms. Dillon completed her task of doing everything she could
to strike a better chord in American law, she raised a rallying cry for us: “We
have yet to get an apology, we have yet to be acknowledged. We have to
crack this thing wide open. CDC has to be made accountable.”184 Ms.
Dillon and her mighty advocates know that California’s legal ban in 1979, as
well as its reiteration in 2021, obviously do not contain effective prohibitions
and did not bring about an end to eugenics in America, but only threw it
deeper into the shadows.185
182. Compare id. (revealing that the federal receivership knew about the eugenic sterilizations
occurring in California and would not stop them from occurring), with Plata, 563 U.S. at 543 (approving
of California’s receivership in order to oversee California’s compliance with federal law).
183. BELLY OF THE BEAST 1:14:37, 1:16:38 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020).
184. Id. at 1:15:14–1:15:35.
185. Amanda Morris, ‘You Just Feel Like Nothing’: California to Pay Sterilization Victims, N.Y. TIMES
(July 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/11/us/california-reparations-eugenics.html
[https://perma.cc/VX24-CU2G] (“Even after California repealed its eugenics law in 1979, it continued
to sterilize women in prison . . . according to a 2014 state report . . . .”); see Stern, supra note 179,
at 1128–30 (discussing the repeal of California’s sterilization law in 1979); VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN
RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS
30–32 (2008) (“Two years after Buck was decided, twelve states has passed new sterilization
legislation . . . .”). The role of federal jurisprudence in the maintenance of state level eugenics policies
ought not to be ignored. Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy form a Lost World,
39 PEPP. L. REV. 101, 110–11 (2011) [hereinafter Nourse, Buck] (“The suit that brought Buck to the
Court was constructed precisely because sterilization laws had become a dead letter due to hostile state
court constitutional rulings. Carrie’s lawyer was affiliated with the very hospital she was suing. The
‘due process’ with which she was provided involved a woman who, as Professor Paul Lombardo found,
concluded that the ‘look’ of Buck’s seven-month-old child, Vivian, proved her imbecilic. Then, too,
the major evidence against Buck was constructed by Harry Laughlin, the author of [state level]
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Forcing injustice into the shadows is better than letting it grow unchecked
in the light.186 However, the state of the law after the 2021 reparation law
was passed187 revealed that positive laws are themselves subject to the
fabric of law that controls the word “due” in “due process of the law.”188
The federal receivership failed to stop eugenic sterilization in California
because “due” is still largely defined by ad hoc judgements under Mathews v.
Eldridge rather than common law stare decisis.189
Ms. Dillon’s ovaries were surgically removed in a California women’s
prison by Dr. James Heinrich without her consent.190 Heinrich’s tortious
and criminal battery on Ms. Dillon’s person caused her to suffer a dangerous
loss of weight that could have resulted in death.191 In response, Heinrich
told Ms. Dillon she “should be happy” to have “lost weight,” and that “so

sterilization laws throughout the country. This hardly reflects the disinterested scrupulosity that
Holmes represented.”).
186. See NOURSE, supra note 185, at 16, 120, 159 (repeatedly noting how “Skinner’s great
innovation” of “strict scrutiny” helped “human rights . . . take on an entirely new character in
constitutional law” despite failing to affirmatively overrule Buck v. Bell to completely dispel “the shadow
of Hitler’s horrors”).
187. Forced or Involuntary Sterilization Compensation Program, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 24211.
188. BELLY OF THE BEAST 27:58–28:40, 29:27–29:35 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (noting the
federal receiver knew about and oversaw eugenic sterilization, revealing that federal versus state control
is less important than the fabric of law the respective government will apply—“we were met with
comments like, ‘well those women wouldn’t want to have any more children, would they?’”); cf. Justin
Ray, California’s Central Role in the Eugenics Movement, L.A. TIMES (July 20, 2021, 5:30 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/newsletter/2021-07-20/california-eugenics-reparationssterilization-essential-california
[https://perma.cc/5MEP-UTW2]
(revealing
that
while
Governor Davis was officially apologizing for California’s involvement in eugenics, it was continuing
in California’s women’s prisons).
189. Victoria Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the
Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 798 (2009) [hereinafter Nourse, A Tale] (tracing the
origin of a Mathews-like balancing consideration to the Lochner era in order to note a clear inconsistency
between fundamental rights holdings like Skinner and substantive due process holdings like Lochner,
resulting in penumbral rights holdings as in “Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court refused to enumerate
a right and instead spoke of liberty”); cf. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE
L.J. 1836, 1865 (2015) (addressing “the reigning Mathews v. Eldridge analysis—under which the court
balances the individual’s private interest at stake against the government’s interest and the potential
accuracy benefits from different or additional procedures”); id. at 1860, 1908 n.323, 1917 (defending
the constitutionality of the “imposition of a special master and receiver” upon “the California prison
system”).
190. BELLY OF THE BEAST 16:50 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020).
191. Id.
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many women would love to have lost the amount of weight that” Ms. Dillon
lost.192
This twisted appeal to the vanity of male decision makers regarding Ms.
Dillon’s fate is central to the classic justification of eugenics in America.193
Weighing and balancing eugenic policies favorably in court requires the
belief that patients who undergo eugenic procedures benefit from them.194
The sickening idea that a patient actually benefits from a doctor’s unwanted
battery was discussed by investigative reporter Corey G. Johnson as an
integral part of California’s eugenics legacy at work in Kelli Dillon’s case:
At the point that Dr. Heinrich was hired sterilization procedures had been
going on for years at multiple prisons. He strongly believed that there were
women that were gaming the system and that needed to be stopped. . . . That
attitude tracked precisely to the historical attitude of the California leaders of
the eugenic movement. They had always used cost/benefit as the justifier for
why they were doing what they were doing. So in that way Heinrich was part
of a legacy.195

The eugenic legacy Dr. Heinrich followed is certainly Californian, but it is
not solely Californian.196 Take, for example, famed eugenicist Harry
Laughlin’s advocacy of eugenics that earned him a prize at the University of
Heidelberg, Germany in the 1930s for inspiring the Nazis to oppress and
murder as many Jewish people as possible.197 Laughlin’s Model Eugenic
Law for the United States began with a cost/benefit analysis to justify its

192. Id. at 16:50–17:00 (“The doctor thought that maybe I was a hypochondriac and he said
that I should be happy that I lost weight; so many women would love to have lost the amount of weight
that I lost.”).
193. Id. at 48:05–49:00 (noting that Californian eugenicists “had always used cost/benefit as the
justifier for why they were doing what they were doing”).
194. Id. at 48:05–49:00; see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (extending the Jacobson
balancing test).
195. BELLY OF THE BEAST 48:05–49:00 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020).
196. See HARRY HAMILTON LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
454 (1922) (giving an example to all fifty states to follow from an Iowan, educated in Missouri, and
working and residing in New York at an organization dedicated to advocating for eugenics).
197. Id.; Harry Laughlin and Eugenics: Nazi Connection, TRUMAN ST. UNIV.,
https://historyofeugenics.
truman.edu/exchanging-ideas/international-discourse/nazi-connection/ [https://perma.cc/F3M9FNGK].
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existence over the claims of one’s natural and civil rights to keep their
reproductive organs intact.198
The cost/benefit analyses of Californian eugenicists that claimed to save
the state millions of dollars required the presupposition that all civil and
human rights be rendered ineffective in tort suits for damages resulting from
unwanted, illegal surgeries.199 As a former obstetrician nurse for
Dr. Heinrich recently noted, California’s 2021 reparations law did not
convince her that eugenics itself was a bad thing the purpose of saving state
money:
As to whether I think it [i.e., eugenic sterilization] should be illegal, not
necessarily. Even if it’s not medically necessary, it could, or would in the long
run save the State funds like Doctor [Heinrich] was saying. Uh, so, you know,
was he wrong in that estimation? Probably not. Because, as I said, the ideal
time to do it to them is when you’re already in there. It just takes a couple
more minutes and then a couple more snips.200

The Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata,201 recently endorsed a reading of the
Eighth Amendment that should allow tort suits in California.202 However,
it overlooked the federal receivership’s own role created by Plata in
administering eugenic policies.203 Ms. Dillon revealed that an entire Star

198. LAUGHLIN, supra note 196, at 454 (beginning his model eugenic sterilization law with a
cost/benefit balancing test: “The certain great racial and social benefit, the possible benefit to the
individual, the ultimate great saving in money by the state must be weighed against the taking away of
a natural power, a possible miscarriage of justice, a possible mistaken diagnosis, a possible surgical
shock, and a possible physiological ill to the person alleged to be a potential parent of defective stock.”);
cf. BELLY OF THE BEAST 1:16:56 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (“Dr. Heinrich also declined [interview
requests], but responded in writing: ‘the new rule deprived women of the option to have their tubes
tied after multiple pregnancies, and thereby sentenced them to suffer through inadvertent pregnancies
and to bear children that they did not wish to bear.’”).
199. BELLY OF THE BEAST 48:05–49:00 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020); cf. Forced or Involuntary
Sterilization Compensation Program, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24211 (future courts may
properly decide that this law waived all claims the state might have made to qualified immunity for any
and all eugenic-based programs).
200. BELLY OF THE BEAST 1:15:41 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (statement of Former OB Nurse,
Valley State Prison).
201. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
202. Id. at 545 (“The medical and mental health care provided by California’s prisons falls below
the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment.”).
203. Compare id. (“The relief ordered by the three-judge court is required by the Constitution
and was authorized by Congress in the PLRA.”), with BELLY OF THE BEAST 27:58–28:40 (Erika Cohn
dir., 2020) (recognizing the role of the federal receivership).
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Chamber can be administered in the void created between state and federal
officers that each blame the other for the wrongs both committed.204
The Holmesian practice of trying to separate procedure from substance
was itself a pretext to uphold potentially any federal or state law.205 It was
based upon a Social Darwinist supposition that human beings are not
inherently equal as the Declaration of Independence strongly
maintained.206 Justice Holmes thus betrayed the “heaven-defended
race”207 referred to in the Declaration of Independence in order to split
hairs according to the eugenic era’s hypothetical cost/benefit analyses given
in Jacobson v. Massachusetts208 here:
[The hypothetical rational decision maker] would have . . . recognized the
possibility of injury to an individual from carelessness in the performance of
it, or even in a conceivable case without carelessness, they generally have

204. Compare Plata, 563 U.S. at 545 (justifying the use of a federal receiver to ensure that
California complied with federal legal standards), with BELLY OF THE BEAST 27:58–28:40, 1:15:41
(Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (demonstrating that the federal receivership did not do what it was supposed
to do in at least two California women’s prisons); cf. Frank Riebli, The Spectre of Star Chamber: The Role of
an Ancient English Tribunal in the Supreme Court’s Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
807, 808–09 (2002) (explaining that the Star Chamber represents themes of “brutality, abuse of power,
oppressive state might overpowering the helpless individual, and persecution” and was “usually a foil,
contrasted with our own courts and legal systems, by adjectives like ‘hated,’ ‘obnoxious,’ and
‘opprobrious’”). But see Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 997 (2021) (citing Countess of Rutland’s Case
[1605] 6 Co. Rep. 52b (Eng.) (Star Chamber)) (showing how the Supreme Court recently began using
Star Chamber opinions as legitimate precedent to help it define the terms of the United States
Constitution).
205. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“The attack is not upon the procedure but upon
the substantive law.”); G. Kristian Miccio, The Death of the Fourteenth Amendment: Castle Rock and Its
Progeny, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277, 296 (2011) (the use of the word “substantive” in relation
to due process is itself “artificial”).
206. Alexander Tsesis, Deliberative Democracy, Truth, and Holmesian Social Darwinism, 72 S.M.U. L.
REV. 495, 496 (2019) (“Justice Holmes’s Social Darwinistic approach to the marketplace of ideas is
fraught with callous notions of preference for powerful speakers. It stands in opposition to a more
equalitarian understanding of markets, which recognizes the policy balance governments sometimes
undertake to advance important interests that protect open dialogue, while empowering indigent and
powerless individuals to join the conversation.”); Seth Vannatta, Justice Holmes, The Social Darwinist,
14 THE PLURALIST 78 (2019) (noting that “the label of Social Darwinist for [Justice Holmes] is quite
fitting”); Allen Mendenhall, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and the Darwinian Common Law Paradigm, 7 EURO.
J. PRAGMATISM AM. PHIL., 129, 131 (2015); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776).
207. Phillis Wheatley, To His Excellency George Washington [1776].
208. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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considered the risk of such an injury too small to be seriously weighed as
against the benefits coming from the discreet and proper use . . . .209

This so-called balancing test is never actually applied.210 Rather, the
hypothetical existence of a balancing test that could weigh in favor of the
Court’s decision is cited.211 As is relevant to today’s COVID pandemic,
Jacobson was a state police-powers decision,212 and the Supreme Court in
NFIB v. Sebelius213 disclaimed any federal police power to do such a thing
nationally.214 If the Court ever went back on this promise, Buck might be
unleashed in America on the national level along the lines of Jacobson.215
There are a few decisions that extend substantive due process rights to
individuals, such as Griswold v. Connecticut, which was extended in Roe v. Wade,
Lawrence v. Texas,216 and Obergefell v. Hodges.217 However, these decisions
were still made under the same framework that doubted the legitimacy of
substantive rights in that the very term “penumbra” stands for the idea that
the rights are not actually found in the United States Constitution.218
Accordingly, the judges that decided these cases missed their opportunity,
209. Id. at 24–25 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pear, 183 Mass. 242, 247 (1903)), extended by Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927).
210. Id. (quoting Pear, 183 Mass. at 247), extended by Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08; Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976). The point of judicial balancing is not to balance interests, but
rather to open the door to “ad hoc” decision-making in which the presupposition that judicial review of
fundamental rights firmly upheld in Crowell v. Benson is set aside for the anti-common law ideology that
“[t]he judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method
of decision-making in all circumstances”—this presupposition opened the door to Mathews’ actual, ad
hoc (i.e., non-precedential) holding: “We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to
the termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully comport with
due process.” Id.
211. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 124–25 (quoting Pear, 183 Mass. at 247 (holding that vaccines give
more benefits than costs to the state, and therefore individuals have no right to contest them even to
confirm that the vaccines given by the state are actually vaccines and do actually create the benefits the
Court presumes they do)), extended by Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08 (applying the same logic, without
weighing or balancing, to eugenic sterilization), extended by Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348–49.
212. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–25.
213. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
214. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 557 (“Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to
their activities, remains vested in the States.”).
215. Compare id. at 593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining the state may not compel citizens
to pay medical bills), with Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
216. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
217. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 379, 481–82 (1965). But see Nourse, A Tale,
supra note 189, at 798 (maintaining that these cases only “spoke of liberty” and not substantive due
process rights).
218. Nourse, A Tale, supra note 189, at 798–99.
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represented by Justice Goldberg’s Griswold concurrence, to expressly reverse
Buck v. Bell under the Ninth Amendment.219
As a direct result, Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges220
asserted that Griswold’s applications of substantive rights under the Due
Process Clause were an extension of the rationale in Dred Scott.221 Had the
Court expressly overruled Osborn v. Nicholson,222 as it ought to have in
Obergefell,223 then it might have been more difficult for Roberts to draw a
false connection between the right of gay men to marry and Dred Scott when
he wrote:
The need for restraint in administering the strong medicine of substantive due
process is a lesson this Court has learned the hard way. The Court first applied
substantive due process to strike down a statute in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
19 HOW. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857). There the Court invalidated the Missouri
Compromise on the ground that legislation restricting the institution of
slavery violated the implied rights of slaveholders. The Court relied on its
own conception of liberty and property in doing so.224

Dred Scott’s apparent overruling of the Missouri Compromise was a red
herring;225 when Dred Scott was decided the Missouri Compromise was
already repealed, and the main issue decided in Dred Scott, that slavery
extended to the territories, supported the constitutional legitimacy of the
Compromise of 1850, which included the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, a
wretched law that the Taney Court declared constitutional a year later in
Ableman v. Booth.226 Nor did Dred Scott cite to substantive due process as
219. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 630 (Goldberg, J., concurring); cf. NOURSE, supra note 185, at 172
(similarly criticizing Skinner for not affirmatively overruling Buck); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857), superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XIV (1868).
220. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
221. Id. at 695–96 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)).
222. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654 (1871).
223. Id. at 662–63 (refusing to decide that black people have a natural right to marry after the
Civil War, stating that the recognition of such a right would have taken hypothetical property away
from slaveholders: “The proposition, if carried out in this case, would, in effect, take away one man’s
property and give it to another. And the deprivation would be ‘without due process of law.’”). At best
we can try to say that Obergefell implicitly abrogated Osborn, but nothing more. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664
(“[T]he right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”).
224. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 695–96 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, 10 Stat. 277 (repealing the Missouri Compromise); Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850, Pub. L. 462, §§ 2–6, 10 (repeating “State or Territory” several times to ensure that
this Act’s scope encompassed the entire country, and authorizing slave catchers “to seize or arrest and
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Chief Justice Roberts claimed.227 Rather, Dred Scott was an apt example of
what happens when due process is misapplied, which can properly be traced
directly from Dred Scott to Holmes’s Lochner dissent, rather than Lochner’s
majority opinion.228
Justice Holmes dissented in Lochner and similar cases in defense of
government powers against individual liberties,229 as clarified in his Olmstead
dissent.230 Chief Justice Roberts did not see the irony of his own statement,
transport such [fugitive slaves] to the State or Territory form which he escaped”); The Compromise of
1850 and the Fugitive Slave Act, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2951.html (“Finally,
California would be admitted as a free state. To pacify slave-state politicians, who would have objected
to the imbalance created by adding another free state, the Fugitive Slave Act was passed. Of all the
bills that made up the Compromise of 1850, the Fugitive Slave Act was the most controversial. It
required citizens to assist in the recovery of fugitive slaves. It denied the fugitive’s right to a jury trial.
[etc.]”); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 455 (1857) (choosing to ignore the Compromise of 1850,
the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, and the Fugitive Slaves Act of 1850 while also affirming that it could
have overruled these acts in favor of freedom in Dred Scott by asserting the Court’s power to overrule
the Missouri Compromise even though that law was no longer was on the books: “the eighth section
of the act of 1820, known commonly as the Missouri Compromise law . . . was unconstitutional”);
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1858) (“[I]n the judgment of this court, the act of Congress
commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution
of the United States . . . .”); cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 273–74 (1901) (noting the further
errors in Chief Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion; specifically that “before the Chief Justice gave
utterance to his opinion upon the merits, he had already disposed of the case adversely to the plaintiff
upon the question of jurisdiction, and that, in view of the excited political condition of the country at
the time, it is unfortunate that he felt compelled to discuss the question upon the merits”—this, in
turn, should cast strong doubts upon Taney’s previous invention of the political question doctrine years
earlier in Luther v. Borden). But see Letters to the Editor, What ‘Dred Scott’ did and didn’t do, WASH. POST
(Oct. 13,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-dred-scott-did-and-didntdo/2016/10/13/693280e6-8fdf-11e6-bc00-1a9756d4111b_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6584MX8F] (expressing disagreement with one of Washington Post’s articles for stating that Dred Scott
“‘held the Fugitive Slave Act to be valid’” when Dred Scott did not discuss the Fugitive Slave Act—
while Dred Scott could have, and actually should have addressed the Fugitive Slave Act as it was the
most unjust part of the Compromise of 1850 that was actually law at the time instead of the Missouri
Compromise, this letter writer was technically correct that the Taney Court waited until Ableman v.
Booth to declare the Fugitive Slave Act constitutional in order to preempt free state habeas corpus
proceedings in the North).
227. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450 (citing generally to “due process” but not distinguishing types of
due process; there were no categories of due process established in this case).
228. Compare id. (disregarding the due process rights of Dred Scott), with Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (disregarding the due process rights of workers); cf.
Nourse, A Tale, supra note 189, at 781 (noting how public hatred for Dred Scott was coopted by
President Roosevelt to attack the majority opinion of Lochner, leading to problematic myths about what
Lochner stood for, and obscuring what Lochner actually was).
229. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
230. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (establishing
that Holmes believed in upholding state laws regardless of whether individual rights were served by
them).
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“As Justice Holmes memorably put it, ‘The Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,’ a leading work on the
philosophy of Social Darwinism.”231 Obviously, in Buck v. Bell, Holmes
pushed the envelope of a Social Darwinist economic theory farther than
anyone else in United States history.232
Holmes, like all legal positivists, did not take a principled stand against
legislating from the bench.233 Rather, his disagreement with Lochner’s
alleged adoption of Spencer’s Social Statics was about policy, not
principle.234
The economic theories Holmes inserted into our
jurisprudence were redoubled and embellished in Mathews v. Eldridge,235 but
may yet be reversed by the Court under Crowell v. Benson’s236 requirement of
de novo judicial review.237
Investigative reporter Corey G. Johnson uncovered California’s
perpetuation of a penumbral rights framework while he was investigating
Kelli Dillon’s surgery.238 It was difficult for Johnson to uncover any
evidence of eugenic sterilization in California because patient privacy rights
were asserted by the state to justify refusing anyone’s request for

231. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 696–97 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
232. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205–06 (1927) (restating the precepts of eugenic pseudo-science
in order to destroy the rights of “defective persons who if now discharged would become a menace
but if incapable of procreating might be discharged with safety”); cf. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (noting that he was not categorically against constitutionalizing economic theories stating
“I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind”); Holmes, Jr., Law in Science,
supra note 80, at 450–51 (expounding “another evolutionary process which Mr. Herbert Spencer has
made familiar to us by the name of Integration”—Holmes explains that his adoption of an idea, and
even his decision of whether to constitutionalize an economic theory, has to do with the idea’s survival
in a Darwinian battle for its life rather than any sort of reasoned principle that economic theories
should never be used).
233. See Holmes, Jr., Law in Science, supra note 80, at 450–51 (citing approvingly to Herbert
Spencer).
234. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (the reason Holmes would not join the
majority was simply because “a large part of the country does not entertain” the economic theories
embraced by the court—if a clear majority to Holmes’s mind, embraced the constitutionalization of
economic theories, then he would also have embraced it, as he jubilantly did in Buck v. Bell); Thompson,
supra note 162, at 131 (“Holmes[‘s] decision [in Buck v. Bell] can be attributed to his utilitarianistic beliefs
reflected by his personal association with prominent utilitarians and his extensive reading of John
Austin, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham.”).
235. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207, extended by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
347–48 (1976).
236. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
237. Id. at 58–59.
238. BELLY OF THE BEAST 48:05–49:00 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020).
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information.239 Johnson was only able to get a partial view of how big the
system had grown from a whistleblower.240
Johnson’s investigative work revealed how Brandeis’s concept of privacy
rights are enjoyed by “civilized” men to destroy the privacy rights of women
like Kelli Dillon.241 The arcana imperii of the state to perform eugenics was
justified with the penumbra ever since Justice Brandeis’s ironic Star
Chamber defense of privacy rights, and in this sense Brandeis’s own theory
mooted itself.242 Natural human rights, including privacy rights, were
meant to animate government form, and so the correct analogy for human
rights should be a natural life-giving light; a light that is meant to shine in
through the Ninth Amendment, the proverbial skylight of the United States
Constitution, to facilitate discourse about natural rights as if they were
sunlight or starlight that can help us navigate difficult matters of statecraft,
rather than mere shadows emanating from the constitutional text.243
C. HOW MATHEWS’ DEFINITION OF “DUE” OPENED A DOOR TO
AMERICAN STAR CHAMBERS
As demonstrated in The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I, Justice Powell
managed to open a door to Star Chambers in Mathews by using as strategy
he lifted from The Slaughterhouse Cases.244 As made evident by the Powell

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Compare id., with Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (basing American privacy rights on Millar v. Taylor’s citation of Star Chamber history
as common law precedent), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
243. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in original) (noting that the
United States Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (noting how
the United States Constitution “may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
humane justice”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to
the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”); see also
O’Connor, They Often, supra note 28, at 388 (“[T]he Declaration of Independence, for example, speaks
of inalienable God-given rights, the abridgement of which permits revolution.”); THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. pmbl; U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
244. The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I discussed how Justice Powell learned how to make a
horcrux for Buck v. Bell in Mathews from the way The Slaughterhouse Cases made a horcrux for Dred Scott.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (quoting The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
36, 71 (1873)); Holmes, Jr., The Path, supra note 109, at 460–61, extended by Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
207–08 (1927), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
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Memo and Powell’s chairmanship over the committee that drafted the AntiTerrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Justice Powell did not
seem to care much about creating a cost/benefit “supermandate,” or
anything of the like.245 His interest in balancing costs and benefits in
Mathews and Stone, like Justice Holmes’s in Buck v. Bell, was far more practical
to securing his own personal agendas through the old Hegelian maxim that
the ends justify the means.246
Mathews, which is a basic reiteration of this Hegelian ideology, opens the
door to the possibility of Star Chambers in America.247 Its due process
framework is built to affirm almost any “process” administered by the
government as long as the result might have been a rational determination of
an unbiased decision maker; its approval of administrative tribunals (as
demonstrated below) can include executive tribunals coopted and
refashioned into illegitimate, unreviewable Star Chambers.248 For feudal
law is unwritten and lives in the hearts of the conquered; according to
Hobbes it may always be applied once the people make a bargain with their
rulers to avoid a state of absolute war and death.249

245.
Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
on
the
Attack
on
American
Free
Enterprise
System
(Aug. 23,
1971),
https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/democracy/the-lewis-powell-memo-a-corporate-blueprint-todominate-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/V3QD-9LHU] [hereinafter Powell Memo]; Lewis F. Powell
Jr., Habeas Corpus Committee – Report, Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, Box 777/Folder 6, at 7–27 (1990)
[hereinafter Powell Report] (advocating the virtual suspension of habeas corpus by statute without
engaging in the ruse of cost benefit balancing), adopted by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214; see Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Forward: Congress,
Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 309 (1996) (“I have suggested that
a general requirement of cost-benefit balancing—a substantive super mandate—should be enacted.”).
246. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 142 (S.W. Dyde trans.,
2001) (“To this place belongs the famous sentence, ‘The end justifies the means.’”); Sheldon M.
Novick, Justice Holmes’s Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 703, 706, 722 (1992) (noting how Holmes was
“strongly influenced by Hegel”).
247. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (deciding that “an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the
termination” of a property right); Riebli, supra note 204, at 810–11 (noting that prior to Mathews, the
Court regularly used the Star Chamber as a foil to define what the United States Constitution was
designed to preclude); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means . . . would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.”).
248. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348–49; see Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (affirming the government’s
authority to sterilize individuals with mental disabilities).
249. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 85–86 (explaining that humans in a state of nature exist in a state
of “warre of every man against every man”); id. at 119 (explaining that when humans choose to avoid
the state of nature by forming a society “[t]his is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN”).
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Mathews’ role as a precedent for the ad hoc denial of due process suits was
emphasized by its express decision that no evidentiary hearing was required
to administer due process.250 Its one-and-done ad hoc approach eventually
disconnected large swathes of federal jurisprudence from the common law
principle of stare decisis.251 It convinced most plaintiff counsels to pursue
the application of balancing tests rather than structural arguments under
Crowell v. Benson.252 However, a successful balancing analysis is extremely
rare, the work must be repeated in every similar case, and the ad hoc nature
of the Mathews framework makes decisions made under Mathews extremely
vulnerable to reversal.253
This was all by design, because Mathews’ ad hoc decisionmaking tends to
give judges the comforting feeling of control in an increasingly uncertain
world.254 Mathews was decided on February 24, 1976—early in the term,
signaling it was not seen as one of the Court’s more important decisions that
year.255 On the same day, Stone v. Powell256 was argued.257 In Stone, which
was seen as the more important decision at the time, Justice Powell repeated
his reasoning from Mathews and revealed its origins in the idea of finality
expressed by Professor Paul M. Bator.258
250. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (setting forth the standard for “ad hoc[] weighing of fiscal and
administrative burdens against the interests of a particular category of claimants.”). The basic problem
with Mathews may be summed up as a “quality of justice” issue as explained by Justice Stevens when he
said that “there can be only one answer to that question no matter what standard of appellate review is
applied.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 327–28 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(emphasis in original).
251. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
252. Id. (trusting the final decisions regarding a class of property right to bureaucracy); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (the Crowell Court would probably have interpreted the Mathews Court
as inappropriately “establish[ing] a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system,
wherever fundamental rights depend”).
253. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348; see Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 340 (2014) (applying
Mathews to decide that the grand jury’s determination cannot be revisited).
254. Compare Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 162, at 1068 (touting the use of cost/benefit
balancing tests as a way of collecting and sharing knowledge “by placing the various effect on-screen,”
which is a very comforting kind of activity), with LULU MILLER, WHY FISH DON’T EXIST 14–15, 97–
106 (2020) (noting that the activity of collecting knowledge is extremely effective at easing
psychological anxiety).
255. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319.
256. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
257. Compare Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319 (decided on Feb. 24, 1976), with Stone, 428 U.S. at 465
(argued on Feb. 24, 1976).
258. Compare Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (“conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is
a factor that must be weighed.”), with Stone, 428 U.S. at 475–76 nn.7–9, 493 n.35 (citing Paul M. Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 465–74, 488–
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In Stone, Powell repeated his reasoning from Mathews as follows: “The
answer is to be found by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment
claims.”259 Thus, Powell endorsed the possibility that a mob-dominated
Court could be an unbiased tribunal.260 Justice Brennan dissented, writing
that cost/benefit balancing “does violence to the congressional power to
frame” statutes.261
Over the decades, Mathews took increasing precedence over Stone until
2004, when Justice O’Connor authored the plurality opinion in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.262 In Hamdi, a watershed habeas corpus decision in the War on
Terror, O’Connor cited to Mathews without mentioning Stone.263 Thus, the
Hamdi Court signaled that Stone was forgotten, or at least invisible under
Mathews, in the habeas context.264
Though Stone was considered far more important in its day,265 habeas
courts did not consistently refer to Stone’s balancing approach, especially

91, 509 (1963)) (premising the question of whether habeas corpus review should occur upon an
overriding concern about the conservation of the fiscal and administrative resources of the court). The
issue of statutory “finality” raised in Mathews is near exactly the opposite of Bator’s characterization of
“finality” of state court criminal trials in that the former is required to establish federal jurisdiction and
the latter is grounds for prudential dismissal. Stone, 428 U.S. at 475–76 nn.7–9, 493 n.35 (1976);
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 331 n.11.
259. Stone, 428 U.S. at 489.
260. Id. at 476 (after reviewing Frank v. Mangum, which analyzed “proceedings which resulted
in his conviction for murder had been dominated by a mob,” the court decided to deny habeas de novo
review, instead applying the ad hoc balancing approach, which can result in affirming mob rule in
future cases).
261. Id. at 515–16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court admits that respondents have
sufficiently alleged that they are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution’ within the meaning of
§ 2254 and that there is no ‘constitutional’ rationale for today’s holding. Rather, the constitutional
‘interest balancing’ approach to this cases is untenable, and I can only view the constitutional garb in
which the Court dresses its result as a disguise for rejection of the longstanding principle that there are
no ‘second class’ constitutional rights for purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction; it is nothing less than
an attempt to provide a veneer of respectability for an obvious usurpation of Congress’ Art. III power
to delineate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).
262. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (weighing “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action” against the government’s asserted interest).
263. Id. at 529 (plurality opinion) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Sam Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only for the
Arguably Innocent?, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (1977) (giving an example of the focus of scholarship
being on Stone rather than Mathews at the time).
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after Fay v. Noia was dismantled in piecemeal fashion.266 Rather, Mathews
displaced Stone.267 In Hamdi, a Mathews approach reversed the ancient use
of habeas corpus to disband inquisitorial tribunals and became a new basis
for the rise of Star Chambers in America.268
As the whimsical Alexander Pope once quipped, “For forms of
government let fools contest / Whate’er is administered best is best.”269
Congruent with this sentiment, Mathews did not require more administrative
process; it was a rubber stamp to exempt meaningful review of
administrative process.270 Mathews said that as long as a process results in
more benefits to society than costs, then the process is constitutionally due,
i.e., the ends justify the means.271
By great contrast, the American revolutionaries contested the English
administration of government forms and separated from England in the
conflict.272 It is a testament to Mathews’ propagandistic success that it bears
repeating the founders’ old disagreement with Pope about the importance
of government forms here.273 Specifically, in 1776 John Adams quipped
back that Pope “flattered tyrants too much.”274

266. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 (1976) (“This final barrier to broad collateral
reexamination of state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (overruling the last
vestiges of Fay, without mentioning Stone).
267. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (determining the Mathews test was
applicable); Metzger, supra note 189.
268. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 745 (2008) (correcting course after Hamdi by establishing common law habeas precedent rather
than applying an ad hoc balancing test).
269. ALEXANDER POPE, POPE’S ESSAY ON MAN AND ESSAY ON CRITICISM 46 (Joseph B.
Seabury ed., 1900).
270. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (deciding that “an evidentiary hearing is not
required prior to the termination” of a property right).
271. Id. at 349; HEGEL, supra note 246; cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (naming the legal doctrine that “the end justifies the means” a “pernicious
doctrine” and ironically citing to Buck v. Bell in the process).
272. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–32 (U.S. 1776); see U.S. CONST. pmbl.
(establishing the Constitution in order “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”).
273. See Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 879, 894–95 (2015) (attesting to the “Mathewsization” of large swathes of American law).
274. See JOHN ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 287 (C. Bradley
Thompson ed., 2000) [hereinafter ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY] (arguing against tyrannical
government).
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Since it was decided, Mathews normalized judicial contempt of the
Article III judicial independence established by John Adams.275 Instead of
reviewing constitutional violations on a case-by-case basis, a grab bag of
administrative state tribunals sprang forth.276 Constitutionally sound
agencies grew up alongside constitutionally questionable ones, until the
Roberts Court cited Privy Council and Star Chamber decisions to rule them
all.277
Even with the Court’s apparent inability to see constitutional gradients
between different tribunals, a few constitutional issues still loom large.278
Immigration Court (“Executive Office for Immigration Review” or
“EOIR”),279 Grand Jury Presentment,280 and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”)281 are all structurally problematic.282 Mathews
275. Id. at 292 (in order to keep judges independent from politics, “their commissions should
be during good behavior, and their salaries ascertained and established by law”), ratified by U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (deciding that the court can dispose of fundamental rights without
ensuring an evidentiary hearing on an ad hoc basis), extended by Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 997
(2021) (endorsing an ad hoc Star Chamber decision to answer a Fourth Amendment question), United
States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (2021) (allowing PTAB, a politically controlled tribunal,
to determine the validity of patents), and Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC,
138 S. Ct. 1365, 1376–77 (2018) (citing to ad hoc Privy Council decisions to justify its decision that
PTAB is constitutional).
276. Laura K. Donohue & Jeremy M. McCabe, Federal Courts: Art. III(1), Art. I(8), Art. IV(3)(2),
Art. II(2)/I(8)(3), and Art. II(1) Adjudication, CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 1, 3 (forthcoming 2021); see, e.g.,
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489–90 (2011) (justifying, generally, the apparently unreviewable
constitutionality of bankruptcy courts under the public rights ideology of Murray’s Lessee). But see
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57–59 (1932) (asserting broad Article III jurisdiction to review the
decisions of administrative tribunals of every stripe for their constitutionality when fundamental rights
are at stake).
277. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 997 (citing Countess of Rutland’s Case [1605] 6 Co. Rep. 52b (Eng.)
(Star Chamber)); Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1970, 1982 (demonstrating constitutional ambiguity of the
Administrative Patent Judges’ positions), extending Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1377 (“But there was another
means of canceling a patent in 18th-century England, which more closely resembles inter partes review:
a petition to the Privy Council to vacate a patent.”); cf. Riebli, supra note 204, at 810–11 (noting that the
Court formerly used the Star Chamber as a symbol of injustice and unconstitutionality).
278. For example, an inquiry that continues to rankle the Court is what it means for the U.S.
federal government to be a limited government. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533 (2012).
279. Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 433, 496 (1992) (properly likening EOIR to an inquisition).
280. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 340–41 (2014) (“Even
under Mathews, they have no right to revisit the grand jury’s finding.”).
281. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1885c).
282. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907–08 (2017) (“The purpose of the
structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees.”).
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cannot paper over the ways these tribunals constitutionally breach the idea
of due process without causing blatant irony.283
First, recent review of EOIR demonstrated how Mathews opened the way
back up to American feudal and canon law through the virtual destruction
of Mathews itself.284 For most, the adoption of Mathews is premised upon a
belief that a lasting balancing test structure can be maintained without
endorsing an inquisition.285 In other words, most lawyers who endorsed
Mathews believed that a decision like DHS v. Thuraissigiam was impossible.286
Prior to Thuraissigiam, Justice O’Connor’s application of a Mathews
balancing test in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld gave us an important clue.287 O’Connor
remanded Hamdi to a military tribunal to do a cost/benefit balancing test
about whether to keep a United States citizen imprisoned without a trial.288
The military ignored Hamdi, stripped Hamdi of his citizenship, deported him
to Saudi Arabia, and put him on a no-fly list.289
The first lesson from Hamdi was that direct equitable orders are preferable
to remands of cost/benefit balancing tests.290 The second Hamdi lesson
was that keeping a false hope that the military would respond favorably to

283. Compare Kaley, 571 U.S. at 340–41 (using Mathews to make grand jury decisions
unreviewable in federal court even if they effectively abridge thoroughly established Sixth Amendment
rights), with Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Kaley v. United States: A ‘Frightening’ Ruling, BRENNAN CTR. JUSTICE
(Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/kaley-v-united-statesfrightening-ruling [https://perma.cc/YC3D-LHSQ] (“[D]espite the jokes about grand juries and ham
sandwiches, grand jury proceedings are essentially one-sided; grand jurors hear evidence presented by
prosecutors, and no judge is present.”).
284. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 32 (1982)).
285. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
963 (1987) (“Balancing was a progressive, up-beat, ‘can-do’ judicial attitude.”); cf. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32
(applying a Mathews balancing test); Metzger, supra note 189 (noting that “[i]n the due process realm”
the Mathews test is “the reining . . . analysis”).
286. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982 (quoting dicta from a cost/benefit balancing test
administered in Landon v. Plasencia as if it were a common law holding deserving of the honored status
of stare decisis).
287. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Mathews dictates that
the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing ‘the private interest that will be affected
by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest, ‘including the function involved’ and
the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process.”).
288. Id. at 538 (“There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be
met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.”).
289. Dahlia Lithwick, Nevermind: Hamdi Wasn’t So Bad After All, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2004),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/09/hamdi-wasn-t-so-bad-after-all.html [https://perma.
cc/R5TZ-9TUA] [hereinafter Lithwick, Nevermind].
290. Cf. id.; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
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balancing tests could destroy a party’s rights and undermine judicial
legitimacy.291 Remanding a Mathews cost/benefit balancing test on the
military, or similarly situated executive tribunal, is tantamount to abdicating
judicial authority.292
Now it is easy to expose Mathews as fundamentally self-destructive. In
Thuraissigiam, the Court asserted dicta from Landon v. Plasencia293 (a Mathews
balancing test case) and dispensed with the Mathews balancing test itself.294
It also uprooted the original case law that developed plenary power doctrine
during the eugenic era, emphasizing its reliance on Landon alone.295 In this
way, Thuraissigiam simultaneously asserted dicta stated in a Mathews test as a
holding and demolished the Mathews test to deny immigrants the basic
protections of habeas corpus.296
In Kaley v. United States,297 the self-destructive nature of Mathews gave rise
to grand juries that can strip suspects of their express constitutional rights
before trial.298 In the Kaleys’ secret, ex parte grand jury proceeding, only
the prosecutor’s evidence was presented.299 The grand jury system

291. Cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (expressing hope in the adequacy of military tribunals in
upholding standards required by the court); Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 289.
292. Cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–38 (demonstrating that by hoping a military tribunal would
apply the law the same way an Article III court would, the United States Supreme Court abdicated any
chance it had of securing a United States citizen’s right to a treason trial before being punished).
Administrative tribunals seem uninterested in following the Court’s controlling interpretations of the
law absent direct equitable orders forcing them to comply. Compare Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct.
1474, 1486 (2021) (rejecting cost/benefit balancing tests and deciding: “If men must turn square
corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn
square corners when it deals with them.”), with Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441, 442–45
(BIA 2018) (deciding the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law is limited to its facts rather
than applicable in all cases, i.e., if the Court wanted to ensure that the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) adopt its interpretation of unambiguous statutory text it seems it must apparently issue an order);
Matter of LaParra, 28 I&N Dec. 425, 436 (B.I.A 2022) (citing Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 F.4th 351,
354–56 (5th Cir. 2021)) (ignoring Niz-Chavez even when the Fifth Circuit “recently issued a decision
reaching a contrary conclusion”).
293. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
294. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 32).
295. Id. at 1982 (recognizing Nishimura Ekiu and other eugenics era case law were superseded
by law).
296. Id. (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 32).
297. Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320 (2014).
298. Id. at 340–41; see Eisen, supra note 283 (discussing how freezing assets based on a grand
jury indictment “could greatly impact the ability of defendants to exercise their sixth amendment right
to counsel, and can cause undue hardship to those who have yet to be found guilty of a crime”).
299. Eisen, supra note 283.
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affirmed in Kaley was unfathomed by those who wrote the
Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement.300
At the founding of the United States, grand juries were believed to be
rooted in common law as presented by Sir William Blackstone.301 Thus,
the grand jury is defended staunchly in founding texts and required by the
Fifth Amendment before anyone “shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime[.]”302 Grand juries were also adopted by many
states, though there is no federal requirement upon the states to keep
them.303
However, after the American Revolution, grand juries in England were
abolished as “a species of the Star Chamber, which served the purpose of
screening the magistracy.”304 In other words, the grand jury was abolished
in England because its only real purpose was to provide a democratic cover
for law enforcement’s choice not to indict a criminal.305 This is exactly how
grand juries operated in several recent failures to indict police officers in the
United States.306
300. Compare id. (examining recent abuses of civil forfeiture to steal private property from
ordinary Americans), with Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Aug. 11, 1786) (imagining
that civil forfeiture would never be used “on any other element but the water” writing: “A naval force
can never endanger our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed; a land force would do both.”).
301. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301; cf. Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse:
The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the
States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1211–14 (2014) (explaining Blackstone’s strong influence over
grand jury proceedings in the United States).
302. U.S. CONST. amend. V; cf. Richard D. Younger, Grand Juries and the American Revolution,
63 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 257, 268 (1955) (“[T]he grand jury emerged from the American Revolution
with the added prestige and public support which attached to all institutions which had assisted in the
struggle for independence.”).
303. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–38 (1884) (“The natural and obvious inference is
that, in the sense of the constitution, ‘due process of law’ was not meant or intended to include, ex vi
termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case.”); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 914–
924.6 (West 2021) (providing the “Powers and Duties of Grand Juries”).
304. Nathan T. Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury, 29 AM INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 9 (1938) (quoting 39 HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 364 (1838)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
305. Id.
306. Erik Ortiz, Decision Not to Charge NYPD Officer in Eric Garner Case Exposes DOJ Divide, NBC
NEWS (July 17, 2019, 10:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/decision-not-chargenypd-officer-eric-garner-case-exposes-doj-n1030821 [https://perma.cc/A3Q3-2AYJ] (“In 2014, a
Staten Island grand jury declined to indict [Officer Daniel Pantaleo] on criminal charges.”); Bill
Hutchinson, Breonna Taylor Case Sparks Renewed Scrutiny of Grand Juries in Police Misconduct Cases, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 9, 2020, 5:09 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/breonna-taylor-case-sparks-renewedscrutiny-grand-juries/story?id=73438566 [https://perma.cc/YPP6-LDY6]; Salvador Hernandez, A
Grand Juror in the Breonna Taylor Case Said They Were Never Asked to Consider Charges Directly Linked to Her
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If one looks to the historical origin of grand juries, one finds a
problematic mixture of feudal, canon, and common laws.307 All the way
back to its beginnings, the grand jury appeared only to screen the king and
his minions from criticism for the choice of indictment.308 The origin of
this problematic system in the Assize of Clarendon confusingly engrained the
common law with the feudal monarchy prior to the Magna Carta.309
John Adams demonstrated how Americans should question the common
law claims of England in his disputes with Mr. Brattle.310 Adams corrected
Brattle by identifying the English judiciary’s feudal dependency on the
crown and lack of independence generally.311 The grand jury’s similar lack
of independence, as a species of trial controlled and administered by an
executive officer, was unfortunately not corrected by the founders.312
Some bright lines can be drawn to help us find our bearings to analyze
the common law constitutionality of grand juries.313 The common law of
England arose from the common people of England and did not come from

Death,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(Oct. 20,
2020,
5:00
PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/breonna-taylor-case-grand-juror-speaks
[https://perma.cc/B26V-AE9Q]; cf. Nicholas Quah & Laura E. Davis, Here’s a Timeline of Unarmed
Black People Killed By Police Over Past Year, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 1, 2015, 3:46 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/nicholasquah/heres-a-timeline-of-unarmed-black-menkilled-by-police-over [https://perma.cc/6WTV-25Z9] (noting that several unarmed black men are
killed by the police every year without charges being brought against the police officers responsible).
But see Emma Bowman, Minneapolis Reacts to Chauvin Sentence with Fury And Hope, NPR (June 25, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killing-of-george-floyd/ [https://perma.cc/Z89C-9V4T]
(demonstrating that it is possible, though exceptional, for a police officer to be charged from crimes
involving the deaths they cause).
307. Thomas J. McSweeney, Magna Carta and the Right to Trial by Jury, in RANDY J. HOLLAND,
MAGNA CARTA: MUSE & MENTOR 139, 139–40 (2014); see Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534–38 (recounting
the history of the right to trial by jury as integral to self-governance); cf. Elliff, supra note 304, at 3, 9,
15 (describing defendant protections that made a grand jury “less and less a vital safeguard against
wrongful conviction”).
308. Elliff, supra note 304, at 9.
309. Assize of Clarendon [1166], cited in Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529.
310. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 274, at 75.
311. Id. at 76 (“The common law of England is so far from determining that the judges have an
estate for life in their offices, that it has determined the direct contrary; the proofs of this are
innumerable and irresistible.”).
312. Younger, supra note 302, at 268; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (specifically requiring
“presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury” before any person “shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime”).
313. Cf. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534–38 (discussing the nature of grand jury proceedings); ADAMS,
THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 274, at 55 (explaining the role of grand juries at the time); id. at 199–
200 (defending the revolutionary use of grand juries).
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foreign domination of any kind.314 By great contrast, the combination of
canon and feudal law that underpinned the divine right of kings did not
originate in the common law, and instead, was the direct result of the
Norman Conquest.315
King Henry II invented the grand jury in the Assize of Clarendon after the
Norman Conquest and prior to the Magna Carta.316 The Assize of Clarendon
abolished the trial by compurgation,317 the direct predecessor of the
common law petit jury trial,318 and replaced it with the grand jury.319
Through compurgation a sufficient number of an accused’s peers could
acquit a criminal of their crimes,320 while grand juries were gathered for the
purpose of accusation.321

314. 2 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 750 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark
David Hall eds., 2007) (noting the common law preceded and survived both Roman rule and the
Norman Conquest); cf. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 531 (discussing the ancient common law bases of due
process and the grand jury requirement).
315. The topic of the Norman Conquest was covered in The Darks Side of Due Process: Part I,
which referred to these sources for support: Sir Henry Vane [the Younger], A Healing Question 4–5
[1660] (noting that the root of the tree of liberty in England preceded “the evil of that Government
which rose in and with the Norman conquest”); H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 12 (4th ed., 2002) (describing the Norman Conquest as “a catastrophe that determined the
whole future of English law”); cf. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 274, at 55–56 (“That
constitution which has been for so long a time the envy and admiration of surrounding nations; which
has been no less than five and fifty times since the Norman conquest, attacked in parliament, and
attempted to be altered, but without success; . . . has never failed to work the ruin of the authors of all
settled attempts to destroy it.”).
316. McSweeney, supra note 307; Assize of Clarendon [1166], cited in Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529;
Richard H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 613
(1983) (“The modern grand jury traces its origins to the Assize of Clarendon, an enactment of King
Henry II in 1166.”).
317. Josh Perldeiner, Juror Purgators: The Evolution of Compurgation and Jury Nullification,
48 CONN. L. REV. 1641, 1653 (2016).
318. Id. at 1644.
319. Id.; Helmholz, supra note 316, at 613–14.
320. See, e.g., Perldeiner, supra note 317, at 1650–51 (discussing the different forms of
compurgation).
321. William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 175
(1973); see Robert M. Paule, The Perversion of the Historic Function of the Grand Jury in Minnesota, 7 LAW &
INEQ. 299, 301–02 (1989) (“The accusatory body gradually became known as ‘Le Grande Inqueste,’
which provides a logical explanation for the modern title of grand jury.”). But see McSweeney, supra
note 307, at 145 (presenting the grand jury’s purpose as one of acquittal, which is ironic since it
obviously was invented to accuse, and its accusations inevitably resulted in some form of extreme
punishment).
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Finally, the original grand jury proceeding was the trial.322 Anyone
successfully accused by a grand jury was punished by death, lopping off
body parts, or banishment.323 The only form of complete acquittal could
be administered by the grand jury,324 but as noted, the grand jury was not
convened like trials by compurgation to decide whether to acquit,325 nor
were grand juries called by criminal suspects to assist them in avoiding
accusation; rather, they were called forth by the crown or sheriff instead.326
Trial by ordeal, from the former English laws, was preserved by the Assize
of Clarendon, but this sort of trial was also of foreign invention.327 The trial
by ordeal was a growth of the Catholic canon law of Rome rather than
English common law.328 Further, the trial by ordeal was displaced by the
grand jury as the final determiner of punishment and the trial by ordeal, after
the Assize of Clarendon, was only used to modify the severity of punishment
applied.329

322. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (quoting 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 252 (1883)) (“‘[A grand jury] accusation
is practically equivalent to a conviction, subject to the chance of a favorable termination of the ordeal
by
water.
If the ordeal fails, the accused person loses his foot and his hand. If it succeeds, he is nevertheless to
be banished. Accusation, therefore, was equivalent to banishment, at least.’”), quoted in Theodore M.
Kranitz, The Grand Jury: Past—Present—No Future, 24 MO. L. REV. 318, 319 (1959); see also Campbell,
supra note 321, at 175 (“Having no independence from the Crown, these early inquests became potent
weapons for enforcing the royal authority.”).
323. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530; 1 STEPHEN, supra note 322, at 254 (“When trial by ordeal was
abolished and the system of accusation by grand juries was established, absolutely no mode of
ascertaining the truth of an accusation made by a grand jury remained . . . . [T]hus an accusation by a
grand jury became practically equivalent to a conviction.”).
324. McSweeney, supra note 307, at 145.
325. Cf. Perldeiner, supra note 317, at 1653 (offering a perspective on the ending of the trial of
compurgation in Great Britain).
326. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530 (“The body of the country are the accusers.”); Campbell, supra
note 321, at 175 (pointing out that grand juries were originally called by the king, for the crown’s
purposes); 1 STEPHEN, supra note 322, at 254–55 (noting that grand juries “were convened by the
representative of the royal authority”); cf. Kranitz, supra note 322, at 318 (“‘Grand jury in session.’
No more fearsome words can echo through the circuit courthouses of this state.”).
327. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530; see Peter T. Leeson, Ordeals, 55 J.L. & ECON. 691, 711–12 (2012)
(explaining England was influenced by the Church of Rome, and the foreign Church’s ministers
presided over ordeals in England while they existed).
328. Leeson, supra note 327, at 711–12.
329. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530 (quoting 1 STEPHEN, supra note 322, at 252) (explaining if an
accused person passed an ordeal after being accused by a grand jury they would only be banished and
would hopefully avoid being executed or having body parts removed).
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The insinuation of the crown and church with the common laws of
England continued for centuries until the English Civil War.330 During that
time, before the Puritans’ rise to absolute power upon the wings of
Hobbesian madness,331 Lord Coke became the first widely known advocate
of the English common law and constitution.332 Coke was the first to use
the Magna Carta to make the constitutionality of the laws relevant in English
Court.333
Coke was eventually removed from the King’s Bench for authoring his
views,334 his Institutes were officially censored,335 and he was actually tried
and acquitted in the Star Chamber where he once sat as a judge.336 Like a
Saint Paul, the Lord and Noble Edward Coke reversed his former attacks

330. See ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 274, at 61 (referring to Cromwell and
Vane’s dangerous mixtures of religion, politics, and hypocrisy); id. at 241 (discussing the past English
kings, which were “a feudal sovereign and supreme head of the church together”); cf. Henry Vane [the
Younger], A Healing Question 4–5 [1660] (describing Vane’s rejection of feudal law, explaining its source
in the Norman Conquest, and hoping that the Puritan political movement led by Cromwell might
vindicate the preexisting common law).
331. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 46–48; see generally THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH (Ferdinand
Tönnies ed., 1990) (following up Hobbes’s Leviathan in which he likened the Puritan revolution to
Behemoth, another Old Testament monster).
332. 1 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 282–86
(1849) [hereinafter 1 CAMPBELL; see also Jill Lepore, The Rule of History, NEW YORKER (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/20/the-rule-of-history [https://perma.cc/389SBEPF] (“Edward Coke, the person most responsible for reviving interest in Magna Carta in England,
described it as his country’s ‘ancient constitution.’”).
333. Lepore, supra note 332 (“American lawyers see Magna Carta through Coke’s spectacles, as
the legal scholar Roscoe Pound once pointed out.”); Joshua J. Schroeder, Leviathan Goes to Washington:
How to Assert the Separation of Powers in Defense of Future Generations, 15 FLA. A&M U.L. REV. 1, 6 (2021)
[hereinafter Schroeder, Leviathan]; see George P. Smith, II, Marbury v. Madison, Lord Coke And Dr.
Bonham: Relics of the Past, Guidelines For The Present—Judicial Review in Transition?, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 255, 257–58 (1979) (recounting the history of Lord Coke’s use of the constitution in English
courts).
334. 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 332, at 339–45.
335. Id. at 394–98 (discussing the crown’s censorship of Coke’s Institutes, which were “seized by
the Government when he was on his death-bed.”).
336. Id. at 346 (noting that though his enemies conspired vengeance on behalf of the crown,
but “Coke’s energy and integrity triumphed”); 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE lvii (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (noting that Lord Coke was
“assigned a series of Star Chamber prosecutions”); cf. Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2302, 2373 (Eng.)
(Yates, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Star Chamber [is] a Court the very name whereof is sufficient to blast all
precedents brought from it.”).
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on English rights and risked his life by joining the Commons.337 The King’s
attacks on Coke and his allies resulted in an English Civil War.338
The Americans used Coke to distinguish common law from illegitimate
feudal and canon laws.339 From Coke’s example,340 the Americans
adopted patent and copyright laws,341 precluded the suspension of habeas
corpus,342 and established independent courts that they hoped would be
the antithesis of feudal Star Chambers.343 The difference between
independent United States courts and Star Chambers, as defined by Coke,
is the adversarial process as practiced before the petit jury.344
During the American Revolution grand juries were extolled by the
founders as a useful way for the people to resist English domination.345
The founders were quick to endorse grand jury presentment as a vital part
of the common law, without reliable historical evidence.346 They found
little resistance by English Royalists, broadly represented by the Commentaries
of Blackstone, and only a few individuals at the time seemed to denounce
them.347
337. 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 332, at 383–408 (discussing Coke’s role in bringing about the
Statute of Monopolies, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Petition of Right from the House of
Commons).
338. Compare id. at 393–94 (noting taxations without permission of Parliament, resulting in
general warrants to search and seize Coke’s home on his death-bed and to censor his writings), with
JOHN MILTON, EIKONOKLASTES 13 (2d ed. 1650) (referring to the monarch’s stealing of the property
of “every author” as an illegitimate taxation saying “any king heretofore that made a levy upon their
wit, and seized it as his own legitimate” is an illegitimate taxation that was
“a trespass also more than usual against human right”).
339. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio G. Spafford (Mar. 17, 1814) (labeling
Coke’s Institutes “as an elementary work” and warning Americans not to replace Coke with “the wily
sophistries of a Hume or a Blackstone”).
340. Supra note 337.
341. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
342. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
343. U.S. CONST. art. III; Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 14.
344. 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 332, at 383 (Coke’s resolutions were eventually “made the
foundation of the Habeas Corpus Act”); see Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. I c. 10 (Eng.)
(commemorating the English Parliament’s first attempt to secure the common law writ of habeas
corpus from feudal abuse), cited by Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 n.10 (1940) (noting the long
title of Coke’s Habeas Corpus Act 1640 was “[a]n Act for [the Regulating] [] Privie Councell and for
taking away the Court commonly called the Star Chamber”); cf. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–
83 (noting Coke’s opposition to the Star Chamber as anti-common law, and his advocacy of the
adoption of positive laws that secure common law adversarial process rather than an inquisition).
345. Younger, supra note 302, at 268.
346. Id.
347. Id. But see Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to ———— (Oct. 4, 1768) (representing the
American loyalists, who had obvious reasons to dislike the grand jury).
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However, the apparent usefulness of grand juries in the blocking of
English officers from bringing suits against American agitators did not
indicate a common law origin.348 Feudal and canon laws often selfdestructed.349 As symbolized by the Plantagenet Wars of Roses that
stemmed from the root of the Bastard Crown of Normandy,350 not of
English soil,351 it was commonplace for feudal and canon laws to conflict
internally without logical reason.352
348. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (noting that “the peculiar boast and
excellence of the common law” consisted in the “flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation”);
id. at 538 (applying the common law spirit of flexibility to decide that judicial proceedings without a
grand jury are consistent with “an ancient proceeding at common law”); 1 STEPHEN, supra note 322,
at 254–55 (describing the development of the grand jury out of the feudal laws of Normandy). Even
the best critics of grand juries over the past century seemed to skip over this question, even as they
observed the feudal and canon laws that first established the grand jury in contradiction to the common
law. See, e.g., Kranitz, supra note 322, at 318–19 (labeling the grand jury a “common law relic” even
while quoting Hurtado, which beheld that the grand jury originated in English feudal law, not English
common law).
349. ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 274, at 23 (describing the precepts of feudal
slavery and the “wicked confederacy” of feudal and canon law). The Americans observed that by
expressing these wicked systems of canon and feudal laws in America, the English Empire imploded;
the Americans disclaimed any credit for bringing about the end of that empire, which they intended to
extend in perpetuity. Samuel Cooper, Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, T. & J. FLEET, &
J. GILL, Oct. 25, 1780, at 9 [1780] (“Upon our present independence, sweet and valuable as the blessing
is, we may read the inscription, I am found of them that sought me not. Be it to our praise or blame, we
cannot deny, that when we were not searching for it, it happily found us. . . . [I]t is equally certain that
Britain, though she meant to oppose [American independence] with all her power, has by a strange
infatuation, taken the most direct, and perhaps the only methods that could have established it.”).
350. See DAN JONES, THE WARS OF THE ROSES: THE FALL OF THE PLANTAGENETS AND THE
RISE OF THE TUDORS 45 (2015) (“A heavy garrison policy in Normandy had entrenched English rule
across the duchy.”); DAN JONES, THE PLANTAGENETS: THE WARRIOR KINGS AND QUEENS WHO
MADE ENGLAND 16 (2014) (noting how King Henry I attempted an “intermingling of an AngloNorman aristocracy, whose culture and land-holdings straddled the Channel. Meanwhile, in
Queen Matilda he chose a wife who would bring the Norman and Saxon bloodlines together, to heal
the wounds of the Conquest.”).
351. Henry Vane [the Younger], A Healing Question 4–5 [1660]; 1 STEPHEN, supra note 322,
at 254–55 (describing the development of the grand jury out of the feudal laws of Normandy: “[T]he
usual mode of determining questions of fact known to and practised by the Normans was the inquest.
An inquest was a body of persons representing a certain number of townships or other districts . . . .
They were convened by the representative of the royal authority, such as a justice, a sheriff, or a
coroner, as the case might be, and answered upon oath the particular matters proposed to them.”).
352. The White Queen: The Bad Queen (Starz/BBC television broadcast Sept. 1, 2013) (based on
PHILIPPA GREGORY, THE WHITE QUEEN 132 (2013) and PHILIPPA GREGORY, THE LADY OF
RIVERS 135–36 (2008)). This dramatized version of Jacquetta of Luxembourg, Countess of Rivers’
trial for witchcraft demonstrated the circular, ouroboros that feudal and canon law was in England—
at once these fabrics of law created and destroyed many of England’s most celebrated royals and
aristocrats. Id.
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Domestically, it is commonplace for the accused in American courts to
waive the grand jury “right” as a threat to their other rights.353 Grand juries
conduct secret investigations premised on mere relevance, and by waiving
their right to them, an accused may avoid a prosecutor’s fishing
expedition.354 A grand jury can subpoena an accused’s loved ones, business
partners, religious community, and colleagues under penalty of perjury, and
further, such witnesses are usually gagged by orders that can preclude them
from even telling the subject of the grand jury inquest about the existence
of the proceeding against them.355
The similarities of modern grand juries with that of feudal grand juries
are many,356 and their similarities with common law practices are few.357
The grand jury proceeding itself is a trial to determine probable cause
according to which anyone accused is punished.358 Grand jury trials are ex
parte, the proceedings are sealed, hearsay and illegally obtained evidence is
allowed, and the prosecutor can misrepresent the evidence to the witnesses
and grand jurors.359
The situation in Kaley revealed the common use of the grand jury as a tool
to soften up the accused before they even set foot into court.360 Suspects,
353. Grand Jury, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/grandjury [https://perma.cc/4RWK-57Q4] (“Waivers are frequent, and most prosecutions of even serious
offenses in the federal courts are thus initiated by prosecutors.”).
354. Id.; Chris Eskridge, Thoughts on Grand Juries, UNIV. NEBRASKA-LINCOLN,
https://www.unl.edu/eskridge/grandjur211.htm [https://perma.cc/4R87-SHXS] (explaining that a
“[g]rand jury can literally go on a fishing expedition and without any cause subpoena witnesses and
basically: a. force them to testify or be held in contempt [and] b. force them to bring in evidence or be
held in contempt”).
355. Eskridge, supra note 354.
356. Compare id. (explaining the ways in which the modern “grand jury functions as a crime
control mechanism”), with Kranitz, supra note 322, at 318–19 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 529–30 (1884)) (explaining how the ancient version of grand juries was used by the king as a crime
control mechanism), and Campbell, supra note 321, at 175 (“[The grand jury was] conceived as a device
for enlarging and centralizing the authority of the King and providing his rule with the benefits derived
from community accusation of crime.”).
357. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–38 (1884) (explaining how the common law
weighed against a requirement that grand juries be used, refusing to incorporate the Fifth Amendment
grand jury requirement against the states).
358. Id. at 530 (explaining that a person accused under the Assize of Clarendon would be banished
at least, and at most he would have body parts chopped off or be executed—there was not a chance
of full clemency and acquittal after a grand jury accused someone); 1 STEPHEN, supra note 322, at 252–
55.
359. See Eskridge, supra note 354 (“[G]rand jury functions . . . meet in secret and seal their
work.”); Eisen, supra note 283.
360. Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 327–28 (2014).
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even before they are officially accused, are often treated as military targets
and their lives may be dismantled with systematic precision by a militarized
police force.361 If they are not eliminated through the system, then they
can be driven to suicide or killed as symbolized by Aaron Swartz and
Michael Hastings.362
Civil forfeiture itself, as reported in the groundbreaking long-form
journalism of Sarah Stillman, is as corrupt as it is widespread in America.363
Once forfeited property is taken, including cars, houses, cash, and jewelry,
it is auctioned.364 Then there is a fee sharing arrangement between the
federal and state governments for the payout of the stolen goods, and it is
highly difficult, if not impossible, to regain the property once it is wrongfully
seized.365
Kaley ended any prospective chance at challenging the constitutionality of
civil forfeiture through a review of the grand jury process with an
unfortunate choice of words: “If the question in a pre-trial forfeiture case is
whether there is probable cause to think the defendant committed the crime
alleged, then the answer is: whatever the grand jury decides.”366 Then and
there, by closing federal review of grand juries where their operations appear
to conflict with the Constitution, an official American Star Chamber was
born.367 Prior proceedings in federal court to review grand jury
proceedings under the common law were ended, and whatever basis grand
361. See, e.g., id. at 327–28 (“[E]ven prior to conviction . . . the Government c[an]
constitutionally . . . freeze assets of an indicted defendant based on a finding of probable cause to
believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable.”).
362. See THE INTERNET’S OWN BOY: THE STORY OF AARON SWARTZ 1:30:50 (Participant
Media 2014) (discussing the ways Aaron Swartz was abused by the government as a presumptively
innocent person before facing trial); Benjamin Wallace, Who Killed Michael Hastings?, N.Y. MAG.
(Nov. 8,
2013),
https://nymag.com/news/features/michael-hastings-2013-11/
[https://perma.cc/DVG3-QTJ3] (discussing the strange circumstances of Michael Hastings’ death
after successfully ousting General Stanley A. McChrystal through his reporting at Rolling Stone).
363. Sarah
Stillman,
Taken,
NEW
YORKER
(Aug. 5,
2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/3UDZ-SZWP].
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 340–41 (2014).
367. Id. at 340–41; Eisen, supra note 283. Once the adversarial Article III Courts departed from
Crowell v. Benson by abdicating power to review the factual determinations made by non-adversarial,
inquisitorial processes like the grand jury, such tribunals became the very definition of a Star Chamber,
because the Star Chamber was an unreviewable, inquisitorial tribunal. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
57 (1932) (warning the courts not “to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our
system” by shirking the Article III tribunals’ ultimate power to review the facts, because “finality as to
facts becomes in effect finality in law”).
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juries might have had under the common law, as presumed by the drafters
of the Fifth Amendment, was besmirched and degraded.368
Short of amending the Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement,369 the
common law states that if the purpose of a law changes, the law itself has
changed.370 Joseph Story explicitly applied this principle to constitutional
interpretation.371 It may follow that Kaley grand jury presentment is not
“due” under the Fifth Amendment, because the founding purpose of grand
juries was to protect the accused, not to subject them to civil forfeiture.372
It appears that the government is learning that Mathews is actually
beneficial to their interests, judging from a recent brief filed in FBI v.
Fazaga.373 In Fazaga, government officials argued that Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics374 may be abrogated by Mathews’
due process requirement of an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.”375 They are hoping to sideline Bivens

368. Kaley, 571 U.S. at 340–41 (ending Article III inquiry into the propriety of grand jury
decisions).
369. Cf. Campbell, supra note 321, at 182 (“A constitutional amendment is necessary to effect
such a change on the federal level. The enormity of the task must not deter us. Let us begin—now!”).
370. Milborn’s Case [1572] 7 Co. Rep. 6b, 7a (Eng.), extended by Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371, 385 (1933) (reasoning the maxim that cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex “means that no law can
survive the reasons on which it was founded. It needs no statute; it abrogates itself.”); see also Harford
v. United States, 12 U.S. 109, 109–10 (1814) (“[A] repeal by implication ought not to be presumed
unless from the repugnance of the provisions the inference be necessary and unavoidable”); Cope v.
Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 686 (1891) (stating that a statute will only be repealed if a subsequent statute’s
construction does not allow for its survival); Case v. Humphrey, 6 Conn. 130, 131 (1826) (“The
common law must be negative, by the statute, or the matter must be so clearly repugnant, as to imply
a negative, in order to effect a repeal of it.”).
371. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 459–60 (citing 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *79); Chisholm v. Georgia 2 U.S. 419, 474–75 (1793)
(Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (expounding the purposes of the U.S. Constitution by analyzing its preamble).
372. Compare supra note 363 and accompanying text, with U.S. CONST. amend. V (proscribing
the forfeiture of private property absent due process).
373. Brief of Respondents J. Stephen Tidwell and Barbara Walls Supporting Petitioners
at 23–24 n.4, FBI v. Fazaga, No. 28-828, 2021 WL 2301971 (June 7, 2021) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)), request for pro-government balancing test granted by Egbert v. Boule, No.
21-147, slip op. at 11 (2022).
374. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
375. Brief of Respondents J. Stephen Tidwell and Barbara Walls Supporting Petitioners
at 23–24 n.4, FBI v. Fazaga, No. 28-828, 2021 WL 2301971 (June 7, 2021) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)), request for pro-government balancing test granted by Egbert v. Boule, No.
21-147, slip op. at 11 (2022).
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using the Mathews framework in conjunction with the state secrets
doctrine.376
The pro-government Mathews argument raised in Fazaga seems to suggest
that dismissal of potentially all FISC-connected tort suits under the state
secrets doctrine is mandated by the Due Process Clause.377 The officerdefendants argued that FISC regulations requiring ex parte and in camera
review of evidence violates due process with respect to them.378 They also
strongly suggested that the same procedures do not violate due process
when they are applied against the plaintiffs.379
In order to justify the existence of FISC in the United States, FISC was
initially limited to an exclusively foreign jurisdiction.380 To create this
jurisdiction, a regulatory “wall” was built between the FBI’s foreign and
domestic surveillance.381 However, the United States of America Patriot
Act subtly “changed the gathering of foreign intelligence from ‘the’ sole
reason for surveillance, to merely a ‘significant’ purpose.”382
In May 2002, in response to this shift in statutory language, FISC spoke
out for the first time since its inception, alerting the public to its
existence.383 At first, FISC took a stand to defend a logically necessary
regulatory wall.384 For the first time in known United States history the
government appealed a FISC decision, arguing “that Congress’s intent in
changing the wording from ‘the’ to ‘a significant’ purpose was, precisely, to
eliminate the wall between intelligence and surveillance.”385
The government won its appeal,386 justifying the expansion of suspicion
less searches on potentially all United States citizens by breaking down the
376. Id. at 23–24 n.4 (citing Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070
(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Mathews to hold “that use of undisclosed information in adjudications should be
presumptively unconstitutional” and finding that using “undisclosed classified information under these
circumstances violates due process”)).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 32.
380. Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric
Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 524 (2012) [hereinafter Donohue, Technological] (“Prior
to the 9/11 attacks, a wall had been erected between intelligence and law enforcement.”).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 524–25 (citing USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291
(2001)).
383. Id. at 525 (citing In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 621 (FISA Ct. 2002)).
384. Id. at 524–25 (In re All Matters Submitted “required that the wall be rebuilt”).
385. Id. at 525–26 (citing In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)).
386. Id. at 526 (citing Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746).
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wall William Binney physically implemented in his ThinThread program.387
A three-judge panel appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist decided that FISC
was never meant to have treated foreign surveillance differently from
domestic criminal investigations.388 If this decision is law (its legitimacy
remains extremely doubtful),389 it could transform the purpose of criminal
investigations from addressing past crimes, to the elimination of futurethreats-as-crime, as in the movie Minority Report.390
387. A GOOD AMERICAN 1:18:15 (Slingshot Films 2015).
388. Donohue, Technological, supra note 380, at 526.
389. See Amy H. Kastely, Cicero’s De Legibus: Law and Talking Justly Toward a Just Community,
3 YALE J. L. & HUMANS. 1, 3 (1991) (expounding the Ciceronian definition of “law as public discourse
about justice”); id. at 16 (contrasting Cicero’s ideas about public discourse being the foundation of
legitimate law with Plato’s “secret ‘Nocturnal Council’”, which does not allow the public access to
information
needed
to
justify
laws,
i.e.,
to
make them
legitimate
law).
The American Revolutionaries broadly followed Cicero, and during the revolution John Adams firmly
advocated for the public’s right to know as the primary opposition to feudal and canon law. ADAMS,
THE REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 274, at 27 (arguing that “knowledge diffused generally through the
whole body of the people” protected America from feudal and canon law); id. at 28 (“[L]iberty cannot
be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right, from the frame of their
nature, to knowledge, as their great Creator, who does nothing in vain, has given them understandings,
and a desire to know; but besides this, they have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible,
divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the characters and conduct
of their rulers. Rulers are no more than attorneys, agents, and trustees, for the people; and if the cause,
the interest and trust, is insidiously betrayed, or wantonly trifled away, the people have a right to revoke
the authority that they themselves have deputed, and to constitute abler and better agents, attorneys,
and trustees. And the preservation of the means of knowledge among the lowest ranks, is of more
importance to the public than all the property of all the rich men in the country.”), expounding Cicero,
De Officiis 1.13 (“Above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are peculiar to man . . . we esteem
a desire to know the secrets or wonders of creation as indispensable to a happy life. . . . To this passion
for discovering truth there is added a hungering, as it were, for independence, so that a mind wellmoulded by Nature is unwilling to be subject to anybody save one who gives rules of conduct or is a
teacher of truth or who, for the general good, rules according to justice and law.”).
390. Fazaga v. FBI, 965 F.3d 1015, 1065–67 (9th Cir. 2020), rev'd, FBI v. Fazaga, 142 S. Ct. 1051
(2022) (refusing to assert a state secrets defense on behalf of the government, and the government may
still assert this defense, which may then be granted, i.e., we may already be in the Minority Report world
where pre-crime is enough to justify suspicionless searches and seizures); compare Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002), FISA, 92 Stat. 1783, 1784, § 101(b)(2)(B) (allowing investigations of
individuals whose activities are “about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United
States”), and THE UNKNOWN KNOWN 12:03–12:55, 1:32:42–1:33:45 (Participant Media 2014)
(statements of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: “Everything seems amazing in retrospect. Pearl
Harbor seems amazing in retrospect. It’s a failure of imagination. It’s not as though you aren’t aware
of possibilities. But you tend to favor some possibilities more than others. And it’s enormously
important to have priorities . . . you have to pick and choose. Well to the extent you pick and choose
and you’re wrong, the penalty can be enormous . . . . February 4, 2004, SUBJECT: What You Know.
There are known knowns. There are known unknowns. There are unknown unknowns. But there
are also unknown knowns. That is to say, things that you think you know that it turns out you did not.
If you take those words and try to connect them in each way that is possible, there was at least one

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss3/1

54

Schroeder: The Dark Side of Due Process: Part II
SCHROEDER II_STEP 5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART II

2/20/2022 9:53 AM

703

After 9/11, William Binney sounded the alarm that even with a physical
wall in place, ThinThread worked; it did pick up on the 9/11 threat, and the
intelligence it gathered without impinging on the privacy of ordinary
Americans might have been used to stop the attacks.391 However, prior to
9/11, no one seemed to fathom that commercial jets could be used as
weapons.392 Nevertheless, public relations advocates often blame 9/11 on
the former regulatory FISA “wall” between criminal investigations and
foreign surveillance.393
This is a very powerful, loaded argument; something like a Hitler
analogy.394 Such arguments always seem to contain enough bluster to hide
more combination that wasn’t there, the unknown knowns: things that you possibly may know that
you don’t know you know.”), with MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002) (displaying a dystopian
future where the police investigate and punish United States citizens for “pre-crime”), and Elizabeth
Goitein & Faiza Patel, What Went Wrong with the FISA Court, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 16 n.79
(2015) (“Legislators also were concerned [that FISA] . . . would permit indefinite surveillance based on
a vague suspicion of an unspecified, and possibly minor future crime” including crimes with a mere
possibility of occurring ten or more years in the future.); cf. THE MAURITANIAN (Topic Studios 2021)
(arguably, when Minority Report hit the box office the year after 9/11, the United States was already
beginning a transition to investigating and punishing individuals for pre-crime). But see Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (explaining why the Fourth Amendment should preclude FISC
suspicionless surveillance warrants).
391. A GOOD AMERICAN 1:15:15, 1:20:23–1:22:10 (Slingshot Films 2015) (arguing that “9/11
would have been avoided” if the U.S. government didn’t decide to shut down ThinThread right before
the 9/11 attacks); id. at 1:18:15 (noting that Binney’s ThinThread program was used to spy on all U.S.
citizens after 9/11, by physically removing the wall that protected U.S. communications from U.S. spy
programs).
392. Id. at 1:15:15 (showing the Bush administration retained plausible deniability that it did all
it could have done to avoid the 9/11 attacks despite Binney’s whistleblowing). A symbol of the world
that existed prior to 9/11 in U.S. film culture was the movie Home Alone, which had a story plot that
depended upon a time in U.S. history where people could go right from the parking lot to the plane
without a serious security check. See HOME ALONE (20th Century Fox 1990) (depicting a hassle-free
flight to Paris for the McCallister family).
393. See Devin Nunes, Don’t Shackle the NSA Now, NATIONAL REVIEW (July 22, 2014, 8:00
AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/07/dont-shackle-nsa-now-devin-nunes/
[https://perma.cc/R6AL-LCPS] (blaming the regulatory wall as a cause of the 9/11 attacks); see also
LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN
A DIGITAL AGE 27–28 (2016) (quoting Senator Dianne Feinstein’s public relations spiel for the wall’s
breach). But see A GOOD AMERICAN 1:15:15–1:22:10 (Slingshot Films 2015) (noting that ThinThread
had enough information to have helped the Bush administration avoid the 9/11 attacks with a physical,
digital wall in place to protect the communications of U.S. citizens from non-suspicious surveillance,
and that the Bush administration intentionally did not use the intel).
394. Compare Nunes, supra note 393 (“Similar to the situation today, in the decade leading up to
the 9/11 attacks, concerns about civil liberties spawned problematic restrictions on intelligence
gathering.”), with Katie Bo Williams, Trump Compares Intel Leaks to Nazi Germany, THE HILL (Jan. 11,
2017, 1:14 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/313796-trump-compares-intel-leaks-tonazi-germany [https://perma.cc/M3DH-MMX9] (“Donald Trump . . . suggested intelligence officials
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weaknesses in logic.395 As such, nobody ever seems to blame the existence
of FISC or the Bush Administration itself for regulatory shortfall during
9/11; a logic that more closely complies with Occam’s razor than blaming
an obscure regulatory wall between foreign and domestic surveillance.396
Another possibility is that the Bush administration had ThinThread’s
information somewhere, but that it was dismissed as one of Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “unknown knowns.”397 Bush’s public
relations strategists could have made a decision to downplay the intelligence
as untrustworthy, or it may have been overlooked according to a hopeful
misunderstanding of the newfangled technology.398 William Binney’s
central point in coming forward about ThinThread was to say that the
problem that caused 9/11 was not a lack of intelligence, but the breakdown
of trust in the intelligence gathered by Binney’s program—a breakdown that
was not solved by amending FISA to remove the regulatory wall.399

were behind the leak of an unverified dossier full of damaging allegations about him, invoking Nazi
Germany.”).
395. Supra notes 393–94.
396. Transcript of Rice’s 9/11 Commission Statement, CNN (May 19, 2004, 12:25 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/04/08/rice.transcript/
[https://perma.cc/24BDWRP4] (showing national security advisor Condoleeza Rice blamed a lack of “information about
threats inside the United States, something made difficult by structural and legal impediments that
prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies,”
and Rice successfully avoided the insinuation that the Bush Administration effectively had this
intelligence and failed to use it, even after admitting that Bush received a pre-9/11 daily brief entitled
“Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States”); Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,
President’s Daily Brief of Aug. 6, 2001 (Declassified and Approved for Release, Apr. 10, 2004),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB116/pdb8-6-2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EYEVX6Q] (“We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such
as that . . . Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft . . . . Nevertheless, FBI information since that time
indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or
other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.”); cf. A GOOD
AMERICAN 1:15:15–1:22:10 (Slingshot Films 2015).
397. See supra note 389; Herb Lin, The Fourth Quadrant—the Unknown Knowns, LAWFARE (July 9,
2021,
4:05
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/fourth-quadrant-unknown-knowns
[https://perma.cc/B2WT-R7RK].
398. See A GOOD AMERICAN 1:15:15–1:22:10 (Slingshot Films 2015); Chris Whipple, What the
CIA Knew Before 9/11: New Details, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2015, 7:29 AM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/attacks-will-be-spectacular-cia-war-on-terror-bush-bin-laden/
[https://perma.cc/GF9N-VACR].
399. William
Binney,
PBS:
FRONTLINE
(Dec. 13,
2013),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/united-states-ofsecrets/the-frontline-interview-william-binney/ [https://perma.cc/J228-BEG6] (noting that “[w]e do
not, do not, do not spy on Americans”).
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The government’s failure to address its breakdown of inter-agency trust
became ever more concerning as Trump practically declared war on the
Intelligence Community as part of a political ploy to satisfy his base.400
Trump’s role in fanning the flames of strange conspiracy theories about
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Gina Haspel to explain his
defeat in the 2020 election indicates that the trust Binney attempted to flag
has not been rebuilt.401 The Bush Administration’s efforts to repair the
public’s trust in FISC by knocking down FISC’s regulatory wall, did not
address the inter-agency mistrust that William Binney tried to address by
becoming a whistleblower on the issue.402
In Fazaga, government officials spying on United States citizens
emphasized their mistrust in the United States judicial system when they
claimed that the spies deserve Mathews’ due process protection against the
citizens who sued them.403 Mathews is being invoked by government
personnel to protect American Star Chambers from judicial scrutiny.404
400. James Bamford, Anti-Intelligence: What Happens When the President Goes to War with His Own
Spies?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 19, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/147366/antiintelligence [https://perma.cc/663B-9Q5B].
401. Id.; Jonathan Landay & Mark Hosenball, Biden faces repair job at U.S. spy agencies after tumult
under Trump, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2020, 5:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-bidenintelligence/biden-faces-repair-job-at-u-s-spy-agencies-after-tumult-under-trump-idUSKBN27T1C9
[https://perma.cc/J5Y5-2DCY]; Will Steakin, Trump Allies pressed Defense Department to Help Overturn
Election, New Book Says, ABC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2021, 4:09 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/trumpallies-pressed-defense-department-overturn-election-book/story?id=81182008
[https://perma.cc/H472-QW7K]; Fact Check: CIA Director Gina Haspel Was Not Arrested, Injured or Found
Dead, REUTERS (Dec. 4, 2020, 8:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-cia-directorgina-haspel-ar/fact-checkcia-director-gina-haspel-was-not-arrested-injured-or-found-deadidUSKBN28E215 [https://perma.cc/5DZB-U63S].
402. Matt Castelli, CIA Is Losing Its Best and Brightest and Not Just Because of Trump, JUST SECURITY
(Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73641/cia-is-losing-its-best-and-brightest-and-not-justbecause-of-trump/ [https://perma.cc/87G2-2GX6] (noting the need to “restor[e] trust between the
institution and the White House”—and that a big part of this broken trust is the erosion of basic
principles of intelligence gathering that Binney became a whistleblower to defend, including that the
CIA is not supposed to investigate United States citizens); cf. Asha Rangappa, The Legacy of 9/11:
Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Spotlights and Blindspots, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 8, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/78139/the-legacy-of-9-11-counterintelligence-and-counterterrorismspotlights-and-blind-spots/ [https://perma.cc/MU3R-ZT4X] (focusing on the breakdown of the
regulatory wall between FBI’s “intelligence function” and “its law enforcement” function without
addressing how the breakdown of FISC’s regulatory wall might stoke the same kind of mistrust
experienced by William Binney and other whistleblowers that keep coming forward).
403. Brief of Respondents J. Stephen Tidwell and Barbara Walls Supporting Petitioners at 13,
22–24, FBI v. Fazaga, No. 28-828 2021 WL 4976068 at 13, 22–24 (June 7, 2021) (citing Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)), unaddressed by FBI v. Fazaga, 142 S. Ct. 1051, 1058 n.4 (2022).
404. Id.
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Now, in cases like Fazaga, government officials are asking the Supreme
Court to weigh and balance their clear violations of the Fourth Amendment
under Mathews to grant FISC-warranted FBI investigations impunity.405
The law that FISC relies upon, that the government is vigorously
defending in Fazaga, is known as sovereign and qualified immunity.406
These doctrines are directly drawn from the feudal law in The Bankers Case
that was originally rejected in Chisholm v. Georgia.407 This immunity was
again drawn into doubt in recent cases, such as Trump v. Vance408 and Trump
v. Mazars409 under Nixon v. Administrator of General Services410 involving
former President Donald Trump’s tax returns.411
The way qualified and sovereign immunity worked in feudal England
prior to Chisolm was through two layers.412 First, as a matter of sovereign
immunity, virtually adopted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,413 was that “the king
could do no wrong.”414 Things tend to go wrong in imperfect human
405. Id.
406. See Fazaga v. FBI, 965 F.3d 1015, 1031 (9th Cir. 2020), rev'd, FBI v. Fazaga, 142 S. Ct. 1051
(2022) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982))); cf. Joshua J. Schroeder, The Body Snatchers: How the Writ of Habeas Corpus Was Taken
From the People of the United States, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 18 (2016) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Body]
(explaining the feudal origin of the Fitzgerald cases, which resurrected the modern version of sovereign
and qualified immunity in the United States after it was previously disbanded under Chisholm).
407. The Bankers Case [1696] 14 How. St. Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.) (stating the king can do no wrong,
and explaining how, through the king’s grace, his wicked ministers could be granted qualified
immunity—qualified because it is subject to the will of the king who has absolute immunity),
distinguished and delegitimized by Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 470 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.)
(The Bankers Case is not valid law in the United States, nor is any sort of feudalism).
408. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
409. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
410. Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
411. Id. at 472 (noting that the president is “a legitimate class of one” that can be regulated and
sued for violating the law without regard to supposed immunity judicially granted in the Fitzgerald Cases),
implicitly extended by Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2424 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997) (basing
the decision upon the Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs. holding)), and Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. at 2032–
35 (citing Jones, 520 U.S. at 701 (relying upon the Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs. holding)). Given the amount
of litigation involving the Nixon tapes, it is worth noting here that most of the big constitutional
questions arising from preserving and removing presidential materials from the president’s control and
ability to destroy them were answered in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services and that most other
cases, before and after, rely in some respect upon this case. Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 472;
see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) (relying on Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs. regarding the
separation of powers and the limit of protections each branch has from the other).
412. See Schroeder, The Body, supra note 406, at 18–19 (examining and comparing the Fitzgerald
Cases and The Bankers Case).
413. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
414. Schroeder, The Body, supra note 406, at 18–19; Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 765 (White,
J., dissenting).
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systems, but in feudal monarchies those wrongs were always blamed on the
king’s “wicked ministers,” which is where qualified immunity comes in.415
The king would blusterously blame his wicked ministers for all the wrongs
of the kingdom, but he would stop just before beheading his ministers.416
Rather, the king usually protected his wayward vassals with an act of
grace.417 This is qualified immunity; it worked doubly for the king by
creating loyal vassals, who were grateful to keep their heads, and covering
up any involvement the king actually had in the wrongs committed by his
government.418
This whole framework usually falls apart in republics like the United
States, where the people are sovereign.419 When the police become wicked
and murder somebody, as happened to Eric Garner, the police murdered
somebody with a share of the sovereignty of the whole.420 There is no
perceivable, legitimacy-enhancing benefit to a republic for shielding such
wickedness, so it was illogical for the Court to extend qualified immunity in
the Fitzgerald Cases and beyond.421
415. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244–46 (since “the king himself can do no
wrong” the theory of absolute or sovereign immunity, requires a theory that when something does go
wrong it is with “the advice of evil counsellors, and the assistance of wicked ministers” who may either
be punished for the king’s wrongs or granted clemency, which is the same things as qualified immunity);
see The Bankers Case [1696] 14 How. St. Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.).
416. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244–46; see The Bankers Case [1696]
14 How. St. Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.).
417. Supra note 415.
418. Id.
419. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 473 (1793) (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (invalidating The
Bankers Case, in order to profess “that popular sovereignty in which every citizen partakes”).
420. Compare id. (“But why it should be more incompatible, that all the people of a State should
be sued by one citizen, than by one hundred thousand, I cannot perceive, the process in both cases
being alike; and the consequence of a judgment alike.”), with Daily News Editorial Board,
In Eric’s Name: The Inquiry Into Eric Garner’s Death Is Putting Infuriating Facts on the Record, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Oct. 28, 2021, 4:10 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-edit-in-erics-name20211028-dizbaprbfjfsvglagiq4ekthym-story.html
[https://perma.cc/3VEQ-Q4S4]
(“[T]he
extraordinary judicial inquiry into the Police Department’s killing of Eric Granger . . . yielded painful
revelations about the crime and the NYPD’s all-too-common penchant to sweep officers’ misconduct,
even when fatal, under the rug.”).
421. U.S. CONST. pmbl (noting that the United States government’s legitimacy is situated upon
the people’s sovereignty and that it depends upon its capacity to establish a working justice system),
quoted and cited in Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 479 (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1)
(explaining that the United States Constitution’s “words ‘controversies between States and citizens of
another State,’ . . . recognizes and strongly rests on this great moral truth that, justice is the same
whether due from one man or a million, or from a million to one man; because it teaches and greatly
appreciates the value of our free republican national government, which places all our citizens on an
equal footing, and enables each and every [one] of them to obtain justice without any danger of being
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Despite all this, Justice Stevens’s brilliant refutation of feudalism in
Nevada v. Hall was summarily overruled without explanation in Franchise Tax
Board of California v. Hyatt.422 The Hyatt Court did not address the nature of
sovereignty, nor did it overrule Chisholm.423 Nor did the Hyatt Court seem
to imply an adoption of feudalism by its overruling of Hall, but some
American anglophiles may disagree, because Hyatt did speak of Chisholm in
extremely derogatory terms.424
Mathews’ cost/benefit balancing proved, through the experience of Kelli
Dillon and the several structurally problematic tribunals discussed above,
that the only thing needed for feudal Star Chamber courts to proliferate in
America is a lack of effective prohibition.425 The Bivens suit against the
government in Fazaga, appears to be a last ditch effort to save America from
the reemergence of feudal law.426 Unless something fundamentally shifts,
overborne by the weight and number of their opponents; and, because it brings into action, and
enforces this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country, and
consequently that fellow citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each other
in their own courts to have their controversies determined.”).
422. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979) (“The King’s immunity rested primarily on the
structure of the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction that the King could do no wrong. We must,
of course, reject the fiction. It was rejected by the colonists when they declared their independence
from the Crown, and the record in this case discloses an actual wrong committed by Nevada.”), overruled
on other grounds by Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492, 1499 (2019).
423. Hall, 440 U.S. at 415, overruled on other grounds by Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1492, 1499; cf. Randy E.
Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1750
(2007) (examining the “blithe” way Scalia disparaged Chisholm by his “identification of the legislature
with the people themselves, an equation that was widely rejected at the founding and expressly denied
by the Supreme Court in Chisholm.”); Schroeder, We Will, supra note 16, at 28–33 (explaining why Hyatt
was erroneously decided and that Hyatt did nothing and could do nothing to overrule Justice Stevens’
admirable analysis of republican sovereignty in Nevada v. Hall).
424. Compare Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1492, 1498 (implying that the Eleventh Amendment was a kind
of commemoration that Chisholm v. Georgia was incorrectly decided; however, the actual evidence of
this claim is extremely scant and belied by the text of the Eleventh Amendment itself), with JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 459–60 (citing
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 474–75 (Opinion of Jay, C.J.)) (highlighting Chisholm v. Georgia for support of several
of points in Story’s Commentaries, while never suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment was intended
to displace Chisholm).
425. Compare Brief of Respondents J. Stephen Tidwell and Barbara Walls Supporting Petitioners at 13, 22–
24, FBI v. Fazaga, No. 28-828, 2021 WL 2301971 (June 7, 2021) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333 (1976)), request for pro-government balancing test granted by Egbert v. Boule, No. 21-147, slip op. at 11 (2022),
with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (ineffectively prohibiting the behavior of the officers sued in
Fazaga).
426. Schroeder, The Body, supra note 406, at 21–24 (describing how Bivens exists, in part, to
preclude feudal law from reemerging in United States Courts, as well as examining the broader category
of ad hoc rulemaking that supports feudal law in America of which Mathews is merely a part). Fazaga
and cases like it appear to be last ditch efforts on three fronts because: (1) Bivens seems likely to be on
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the government may begin using FISC warrants to treat all United States
citizens like the children in Hernandez v. Mesa,427 and in response to any
subsequent legal challenges the court may quote Mathews to hold that
administrative murder is itself “due” process.428

its way out: Cassandra Robertson, SCOTUS Sharply Limits Bivens Claims—and Hints at Further
Retrenchment, ABA (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/civilrights/practice/2020/scotus-sharply-limits-bivens-claims-and-hints-at-further-retrenchment/
[https://perma.cc/LVU7-SA3Y] (noting in a section entitled “Life after Bivens” that in Hernandez v.
Mesa: “A concurrence joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch recognizes that the Court has already
largely gutted Bivens, writing that the Court has ‘cabined the doctrine’s scope, undermined its
foundation, and limited its precedential value.’ The concurring Justices would therefore go a step
further and ‘abandon the doctrine altogether.’ With two justices willing to eliminate Bivens claims and
three who would largely limit it to its facts, it seems clear that plaintiffs can no longer rely on Bivens to
offer a remedy for violations of constitutional rights.”); (2) because the state secrets doctrine makes
such cases almost impossible to raise: Fazaga, 142 S. Ct. at 1056 (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s
exception to state secret doctrine making this case much more difficult to sustain); Laura K. Donohue,
The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 157–66, 172–84 (2010) (examining Horn v. Huddle as a
case study for how the government either gets cases dismissed through the state secrets doctrine or
settles in exchange for not changing the law); and (3) even where a litigant successfully contracts in
their settlement to preserve a case under the United States Constitution, the Court is likely to dismiss
for lack of standing: Mayfield v. United States, 504 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1042–43 (Dist. Or. 2007) (“I
conclude that 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1823, as amended by the Patriot Act, are unconstitutional because
they violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”), rev’d, 599 F.3d 964, 973
(9th Cir. 2010) (“Given the limited remedy left open by the Settlement Agreement and the absence of
any authority on which the district court could rely to insist sua sponte that the derivative materials be
returned or destroyed, we must conclude that Mayfield lacks standing to pursue his Fourth Amendment
claim. We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court without reaching the merits of Mayfield’s
Fourth Amendment claim, and we remand to the district court with directions to dismiss Mayfield’s
Amended Complaint.”).
427. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020), extended by Egbert v. Boule, No. 21-147, slip
op. at 11–12 (2022) (extending Hernandez to a case involving the violent and warrantless invasion of
a U.S. citizen on his own property by a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agent when there was no illegal
immigrant involved and no legitimate basis for the invasion).
428. Compare Brief of Respondents J. Stephen Tidwell and Barbara Walls Supporting Petitioners
at 13, 22–24, FBI v. Fazaga, No. 28-828, 2021 WL 2301971 (June 7, 2021) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)), unaddressed by FBI v. Fazaga, No. 20-828, slip op. at 5 n.4
(2022) (“adjudicating liability through in camera, ex parte procedures is anathema in our system of
justice, and not to be tolerated absent some compelling justification”), with Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 749–
50 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (administering a cost/benefit balancing test to
determine qualified immunity)), request for pro-government balancing test granted by Egbert v. Boule, No. 21147, slip op. at 11 (2022) (quoting Ziglerfor the new pro-government balancing test in Bivens cases: “A
court faces only one question: whether there is any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress
is better suited to ‘weigh the cost and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’”).
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CONCLUSION OF THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART II
The Dark Side of Due Process: Part II considered the ideological connection
between Justices Holmes and Brandeis to the shadow docket nullification
of Roe v. Wade. Furthermore, it examined the witness of Kelli Dillon to the
shocking reemergence of eugenics in California with the help of the
groundbreaking investigative reporting of Corey G. Johnson and legal
advocacy of Cynthia Chandler. Finally, it expounded upon the emergence
of several modern-day Star Chambers in connection with the dark side of
due process and penumbral rights theory.
In The Dark Side of Due Process: Part III, this series will consider possible
solutions to the legal problems raised in Parts I and II, with special focus on
the Free Kesha movement as a useful framework for pre-existing common
law rights in America.
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